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Beyond Transparency: Rethinking Election Reform from 
an Open Government Perspective 
Michael Halberstam* 
ABSTRACT 
During the past decade, “transparency” has become a focus of dem-
ocratic governance. Open government and right-to-know regimes have 
been around at least since the 1970s. They include measures like open 
meeting laws, campaign finance disclosure, lobbying registration, and 
freedom of information laws. But the Open Government projects—
variously referred to as e-democracy, Open Data, or Government 2.0—
have evolved into something new and different. They view transparency 
not primarily as a right to know, but as a condition for a more efficient, 
intelligent, and cooperative form of democratic government. This Article 
considers how various election reform projects fit with the Open Gov-
ernment model and considers the new opportunities that such projects 
generate. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the turn of the century, “transparency” has emerged as a fo-
cus of democratic governance.1 Government transparency has become a 
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 1 . See, e.g., Ann Florini, Introduction: The Battle Over Transparency, in THE RIGHT TO 
KNOW: TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD 1, 7 (Ann Florini ed., 2007); MARGARET GRAHAM, 
DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF TECHNOPOPULISM (2002); SHANNON E. MARTIN, 
SOCIAL MEDIA AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC NOTICE AND THE WORLD WIDE WEB 
(2014); OPEN GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND PARTICIPATION IN PRACTICE 
(Daniel Lathrop & Laurel Ruma eds., 2010) [hereinafter LATHROP & RUMA, OPEN GOVERNMENT]; 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency 
in Public Life, in GLOBALIZING RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1999 115, 115 (Mat-
thew J. Gibney ed., 2003) (“[T]here is, in democratic societies, a basic right to know, to be informed 
about what the government is doing and why.”); Archon Fung, Infotopia: Unleashing The Demo-
cratic Power of Transparency, 41 POL. & SOC’Y 183 (2013); James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff 
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measure of democratization and a goal of good government reform. This 
is true of election law. Transparency in election administration,2 voting 
rights, 3  redistricting, 4  and campaign finance 5  are widely embraced as 
conditions of fair elections. 
Traditionally, government transparency has been associated with 
right-to-know legislation, such as open records laws, open meeting laws, 
access to court records, legislative transparency, and disclosure policies.6 
The principal purpose of such transparency regimes is thought to afford 
citizens the means to hold their elected and unelected government offi-
cials accountable.7 
                                                                                                             
& James Raymond Vreeland, Democracy and Transparency, 73 J. POL. 1191 (2011); Michael F. 
DiMario, Remarks Before the Conference on Government Information Issues in the 21st Century on 
the Foundations of Federal Public Access Policy, 20 ADMINISTRATIVE NOTES: NEWSLETTER OF THE 
FEDERAL DEPOSITORY LIBRARY PROGRAM No. 17, at 20, 21 (Nov. 15, 1999) (“[T]he concept of 
providing public access to information by and about government . . . [w]e consider . . . absolutely 
basic to our form of government”), available at http://www.fdlp.gov/file-repository/historical-
publications/administrative-notes/1999-adnotes/997-administrative-notes-vol-20-no-17/file; Angel 
Guria, Openness and Transparency—Pillars for Democracy, Trust, and Progress, ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/fr/ 
etatsunis/opennessandtransparency-pillarsfordemocracytrustandprogress.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 
2015) (“Openness and transparency are key ingredients to build accountability and trust, which are 
necessary for the functioning of democracies and market economies.”). 
 2. See, e.g., HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX 115 (2009). 
 3. See generally Michael Halberstam, The Myth of “Conquered Provinces”: Probing the Ex-
tent of the VRA’s Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923 (2011) (argu-
ing that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act functioned primarily as a disclosure and monitoring regime); 
Spencer Overton, Voting Rights Disclosure, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2013) (advocating for more 
transparency in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
2612 (2013), which rendered § 5 of the Voting Rights Act ineffective). 
 4. See generally, e.g., Michael Halberstam, Process Failure and Transparency Reform in Local 
Redistricting, 11 ELECTION L.J. 446 (2012) (advocating for data and process transparency in local 
redistricting). 
 5. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (affirming the 
importance of campaign finance disclosure); Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0., 9 
ELECTION L.J. 273, 273–76 (2011). 
 6. See generally RICHARD J. PELTZ-STEELE, THE LAW OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT (2012) 
(surveying the law of access to government and identifying it as “the law of transparency”). See also 
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT GUIDE (10th ed. 
2009), available at http://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/HOW2FOI.pdf (covering the FOIA, the 
Privacy Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and the Government in the Sunshine Act); Open 
Government Guide, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://rcfp.org/open-
government-guide (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
 7. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 316 (2004); U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Report-
ers Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772–73 (1989) (“[T]he basic purpose of the 
Freedom of Information Act [is] ‘to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’ . . . 
‘[D]emocracy cannot function unless the people are permitted to know what their government is up 
to.’”). 
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Because transparency is assimilated to the right to know, it is not 
always understood that conceptions of government transparency have 
evolved into something new and different.8 I do not refer here to the kind 
of demands for “radical transparency” of a WikiLeaks, which fits within 
the traditional framework of safeguarding against the abuse of power by 
government and ruling elites.9 Rather, transparency reforms that are vari-
ously referred to as Open Government,10 e-democracy,11 Open Data,12 or 
Government 2.013 view access to government information not primarily 
in terms of the right to know, but as a condition for deploying the infor-
mation technologies that have revolutionized the private sector to create 
a more efficient, collaborative, and innovative form of democratic gov-
ernance. In other words, they go “beyond transparency” in its conven-
tional sense.14 
The contemporary open government movement, “Open Govern-
ment,” evolved out of the open data and open source movements in the 
                                                 
 8. See, e.g., RICHARD W. OLIVER, WHAT IS TRANSPARENCY? 2 (2004) (transparency has come 
to mean “active disclosure”); Tim O’Reilly, Government as a Platform, in OPEN GOVERNMENT: 
COLLABORATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND PARTICIPATION IN PRACTICE 11, 12 (Daniel Lathrop & 
Laurel Ruma eds., 2010) (“Government 2.0, then, is the use of technology—especially the collabora-
tive technologies at the heart of Web 2.0—to better solve collective problems at a city, state, nation-
al, and international level. The hope is that Internet technologies will allow us to rebuild the kind of 
participatory government envisioned by our nation’s founders, in which, as Thomas Jefferson wrote 
in a letter to Joseph Cabell, ‘every man . . . feels that he is a participator in the government of affairs, 
not merely at an election one day in the year, but every day.’”). The NYC Transparency Working 
Group and similar groups springing up in different cities across the country exemplify this develop-
ment. See N.Y.C. TRANSPARENCY WORKING GRP., http://nyctwg.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). 
The legal literature recognizing this change is limited and largely confined to administrative law. But 
see generally Harlan Yu & David G. Robinson, The New Ambiguity of “Open Government”, 59 
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 178 (2012) (recognizing that “open government” has acquired a new 
meaning). 
 9. Alasdair Roberts, Wikileaks: The Illusion of Transparency, 78 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 116, 
119 (2012) (“New technologies, applied to the old logic of disclosure, are predicted [by Wikileaks] 
to lead us to a new world of radical transparency: a world in which, as Assange has said, ‘strong 
powers [are] held to account, while the weak [are] protected.’”). 
 10. See LATHROP & RUMA, OPEN GOVERNMENT, supra note 1. 
 11. See, for example, STATE OF THE EUNION: GOVERNMENT 2.0 AND ONWARDS 203–256 (John 
Gøtze & Christian Bering Pedersen eds., 2009), and ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE 
PROMISE AND PROBLEMS OF E-DEMOCRACY: CHALLENGE OF ONLINE CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT 
(2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/governance/public-innovation/35176328.pdf, for a more 
conservative development of the concept. For a more radical development of the concept, see the 
Wikipedia entry on e-democracy: E-democracy, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/e-
democracy (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
 12 . See, for example, The Open Data Institute, founded by Tim Berners-Lee and Nigel 
Shadbolt: About the ODI, OPEN DATA INST., http://theodi.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). 
 13. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. EGGERS, GOVERNMENT 2.0 (2005). 
 14 . See generally BRETT GOLDSTEIN & LAUREN DYSON, BEYOND TRANSPARENCY: OPEN 
DATA AND THE FUTURE OF CIVIC INNOVATION (2013). 
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technology sector.15 It draws on information economics and the econom-
ics of networks, recognizing that the networked society has engendered 
new modes of social production based on the technology of an interac-
tive Internet.16 It advocates active information sharing by government at 
all levels,17 civic/private sector participation in collective problem solv-
ing, and, in its more idealistic strain, the transformation of government 
into a kind of “platform” for convening and enabling collective action.18 
The election law community largely still conceives of open gov-
ernment projects on the traditional model of transparency or openness.19 
But we are beginning to make use of the Open Government model and 
its toolkit: 
• Heather Gerken’s proposal to develop election administration 
data for purposes of performance measurement has helped to 
focus our attention on improving election operations to deliver 
on the promise of constitutionally guaranteed voting 
rights.20And the 2013–2014 Presidential Commission on Elec-
tion Administration has pursued this data-driven approach to 
improve voter registration, reduce excessive lines at the polls, 
and help improve the certification process for new voting tech-
nology at the state level.21 
• In voter registration, The Pew Charitable Trusts (Pew) facilitat-
ed a partnership between top election officials from several 
states, with support from IBM, to create a joint computing cen-
ter called Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC). 
ERIC helps states manage, scrub, and service their voter regis-
                                                 
 15 . See, e.g., JARED DUVAL, NEXT GENERATION DEMOCRACY: WHAT THE OPEN-SOURCE 
REVOLUTION MEANS FOR POWER, POLITICS, AND CHANGE 58ff (2010). 
 16. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 32 (2006). 
 17. See generally, e.g., PATRICIA E. SALKIN & JULIE A. TAPPENDORF, SOCIAL MEDIA AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: NAVIGATING THE NEW PUBLIC SQUARE (2013). 
 18. See generally O’Reilly, supra note 8 (setting forth this vision somewhat in the form of a 
manifesto). 
 19. See, e.g., BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM 
QUANDARY 41–67 (2015) (discussing, inter alia, transparency as a tool in political process regula-
tion). 
 20. See generally GERKEN, supra note 2. 
 21 . See generally PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING 
EXPERIENCE (2014), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2014/01/Amer-Voting-
Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf. 
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tration data by sharing registration information previously 
locked up in separate state databases.22 
• In redistricting, a joint working group of the American Enter-
prise Institute and the Brookings Institution set forth basic prin-
ciples of transparency and open data in the redistricting process. 
These principles were influenced by the “best practices” devel-
oped by California’s Statewide Database under the direction of 
Karin Mac Donald.23 California’s Statewide Database has pio-
neered the collection, production, and dissemination of political 
and demographic data as a public service.24 Mac Donald has al-
so been instrumental in developing the institutional mecha-
nisms to put this data to use in citizens redistricting, which re-
placed statewide legislative redistricting in California during 
this decennial redistricting cycle.25 Separately, the Public Map-
ping Project, founded by Micah Altman and Michael MacDon-
ald, developed an online, interactive, data visualization and po-
litical mapping system called DistrictBuilderTM, which has giv-
en the general public free access to user-friendly redistricting 
software and encouraged public participation in the 2012 redis-
tricting cycle.26 
• In the voting rights area, comprehensive election databases are 
critical to the enforcement of voting rights, especially in light of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent 2013 decision in Shelby v. 
Holder, which disabled the information forcing “preclearance 
regime.”27 But Voting Rights Act litigation, which now remains 
the principal vehicle to challenge violations, requires parties to 
analyze election data and district performance information for 
the past three election cycles.28 Michael Halberstam,29 Spencer 
                                                 
 22. Erin Ferns Lee, Pew Report Exemplifies Need to Bring Voter Registration to the 21st Cen-
tury, PROJECT VOTE BLOG (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.projectvote.org/blog/2012/02/pew-report-
exemplifies-need-to-bring-voter-registration-to-the-21st-century/. 
 23. Karin Mac Donald participated in the Brookings discussions. 
 24. See Halberstam, supra note 4 (describing SDWB function in comparison to New York 
State’s LATFOR); STATEWIDE DATABASE, http://www.statewidedatabase.org (last visited Mar. 1, 
2015). 
 25. See generally Karin Mac Donald, Adventures in Redistricting: A Look at the California 
Redistricting Commission, 11 ELECTION L.J. 472 (2012) (describing her participation in the process). 
 26. See DISTRICTBUILDER, http://www.publicmapping.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
 27. Shelby v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 28. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 367 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 29. See generally Halberstam, supra note 4. 
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Overton,30 and others have suggested that voting rights disclo-
sure systems could satisfy at least some of the information re-
quirements of civil rights advocates, make redistricting more 
open and transparent, but also save local governments consid-
erable costs by making this information easily available during 
litigation, and by avoiding litigation in the first place. 
In all these areas, however, the potential of the Open Government toolkit 
is not always recognized. 
This Article explores how current election reform projects fit with 
the contemporary Open Government model, and how greater clarity 
about the goals of this model might inform these projects. It begins by 
distinguishing four types of government transparency or openness—(1) 
right-to-know transparency, (2) transparency as regulation, (3) transpar-
ency in regulation, and (4) transparency as Open Government—and re-
lates this typology to competing conceptualizations in the literature. This 
analysis provides a clear statement of the features of Open Government, 
which is then applied to the examination of the different election reform 
projects described above. 
Part II distinguishes between four different conceptions of govern-
ment transparency and gives an account of the Open Government model. 
Part III examines the shift from a concern with voting rights to a concern 
with operations in the election law community. Part III.A considers Pro-
fessor Gerken’s demand that we focus on generating data about election 
administration. Part III.B describes the Pew’s initiative to develop infor-
mation sharing to solve voter registration problems. Part IV describes 
how Open Data in redistricting works and how it has provided opportuni-
ties for public participation. Part V describes how Open Government 
platforms may help address the Supreme Court’s invalidation of Voting 
Rights Act preclearance. Part VI considers criticisms of the Open Gov-
ernment approach. Part VII concludes. 
II. BEYOND TRANSPARENCY: FROM RIGHTS TO WELFARE 
Concepts of transparency and open government have taken on in-
creasing importance in connection with contemporary efforts at govern-
ment reform and democratization. But in the legal literature, transparen-
cy and open government are often used ambiguously, and to make things 
worse, synonymously with other terms like “freedom of information” or 
                                                 
 30. See generally Overton, supra note 3. 
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“sunshine laws.” The “opacity of transparency” has thus been remarked 
upon by more than one commentator.31 
Professor Richard Peltz-Steele highlights this in his leading text-
book on the law of access to government information. Defining the “law 
of access to government” as “freedom of information,” he writes: 
“Whether the mechanism of access is common law, administrative rule, 
sunshine statute, or constitutional doctrine, freedom of information in its 
broadest formulation is simply transparency. Transparency is a sine qua 
non of democracy, hand in hand with free speech and fair elections.”32 
Peltz-Steele thus identifies transparency and freedom of information with 
the law of access to government information in the service of democracy. 
The law of access defines rights that can be vindicated in the courts, such 
as the right of access to government records under the federal Freedom 
of Information Act. Transparency or freedom of information law thus 
concerns the scope of such rights of access and the legal doctrines justi-
fying them. At the same time, Peltz-Steele points out that freedom of 
information is also often used in a more limited sense to mean the right 
of access to information held by the executive.33 
The conventional use of transparency is thus both too narrow and 
too broad to account for transparency in the different senses in which it 
has become important. Consequently, Archon Fung and coauthors distin-
guish between “right to know” transparency—essentially Peltz-Steele’s 
law of access to government information—and “targeted transparen-
cy”—information-pushing regimes like securities disclosure or food la-
beling, in which government forces private entities, but also government 
entities,34 to disclose specific information in standardized formats.35 Ac-
cording to Fung and coauthors, right-to-know laws represent a first gen-
eration of transparency policies “that aim to generally inform public dis-
course,” whereas “targeted transparency aims to influence specific 
choices.”36 
                                                 
 31. See generally, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 
(2006) [hereinafter Fenster, Opacity]; Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1339 (2011); Yu & Robinson, supra note 8. 
 32. PELTZ-STEELE, supra note 6, at xv. 
 33. Id. at 125. 
 34. For example, Cass Sunstein argues for applying the same kind of behavior altering infor-
mation regimes to government regulators as government regulators apply to the regulation of private 
entities. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 35 (2013). 
 35 . See ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF 
TRANSPARENCY 39 (2007). 
 36. Id. at 39. Fung and coauthors then distinguish between second- and third-generation target-
ed transparency, where the latter describes contemporary Open Government policies. 
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A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on transparency in 
the executive branch distinguishes two additional types of transparency.37 
Apart from right-to-know statutes, which provide the public presumed 
access to certain executive branch records and meetings, the CRS authors 
first distinguish public access to, and participation in, rulemaking as a 
form of government transparency.38 Such transparency in the regulatory 
process was first established by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
in 1947, which required executive branch agencies to publish proposed 
rules together with their rationale, allow for public comment, and take 
public comments into account in their final rulemaking.39 
Secondly, the CRS authors identify “initiatives in which transpar-
ency may not be the primary focus, but a component or byproduct of [its] 
effects.”40 President Obama’s Transparency and Open Government Di-
rective provides an important example, which, inter alia, requires that 
administrative agencies identify and publish “high-value datasets” to en-
gage the energies of market forces and nongovernmental organizations in 
government problem solving.41 Such policies go beyond transparency in 
Peltz-Steele’s sense, but also beyond the use of disclosure regimes or 
public participation in rulemaking. 
These and other discussions of transparency in the legal literature 
have contributed to our understanding of the concept. But the legal litera-
ture on transparency does not converge on a particular typology of 
“transparency.”42 In proposing what I believe to be a more complete and 
helpful set of distinctions, I draw on these contributions as follows.43 
                                                 
 37 . WENDY GINSBERG ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42817, GOVERNMENT 
TRANSPARENCY AND SECRECY: AN EXAMINATION OF MEANING AND ITS USE IN THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH (2012), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42817.pdf. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 60, Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–
559, 701–706 (2010)). 
 40. GINSBERG ET AL., supra note 37, at 9. 
 41 . See U.S. GEN. SERV. ADMIN., GSA OPEN GOVERNMENT PLAN, VERSION 3.0, FISCAL 
YEARS 2014–2016 8, 9 (2014), available at http://www.gsa.gov/portal/mediaId/193259/fileName/ 
GSA_Open_Government_Plan_v3.action; Memorandum from the Executive Office of the President, 
Office of Management and Budget to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, at 2 (Dec. 
8, 2009) [hereinafter Open Government Memorandum], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf. 
 42. For different treatments of transparency, see FUNG ET AL., supra note 35; LATHROP & 
RUMA, OPEN GOVERNMENT, supra note 1; Cary Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Partici-
pation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 924 (2009); Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2011); Kenneth Feinberg, Transparency and Civil Justice: The Internal and 
External Value of Sunlight, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2009); Mark Fenster, Designing Transparency: 
The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239 (2008); Mark Fenster, 
Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617 (2010) [hereinafter Fenster, 
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I distinguish between four different types of transparency: 
1. Transparency as the Right to Know; 
2. Transparency as Regulation/Mandated Disclosure; 
3. Transparency in Rulemaking; and 
4. Transparency as Open Government. 
I discuss each of these further in the following sections. Whereas the first 
three are intended to be mainly descriptive, the latter is aspirational in 
that it includes a healthy dose of the kind of “transparency populism” 
that Mark Fenster and others have criticized.44 
A. Right-to-Know Transparency 
The idea of government transparency is most frequently associated 
with a “right to know” or a “right to public information.” This right to 
know is reflected in twentieth century sunshine laws, which include open 
records and open meeting laws.45 Collectively, such open records and 
open meetings laws are referred to as “open government” legislation. 
At the federal level, the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 
(FOIA), as amended, is the most important open records statute.46 The 
FOIA replaced the APA’s public information section.47 It effected two 
fundamental changes in the right of access to executive branch infor-
mation. First, FOIA’s 1974 amendments shifted the traditional common 
law (and later statutory) burden of showing demonstrable need for a par-
ticular government document to the government by presumptively grant-
ing access, subject to nine specific exemptions on which the government 
                                                                                                             
Seeing the State]; Eugene R. Fidell, Transparency, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 457 (2009); William Funk, 
Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law—Three Examples as an Object Les-
son, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (2009); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain 
Sight? Timing and Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157 (2009); Seth 
F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1011 (2008); Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481 (2009); Mi-
chael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure Through 
Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory 
Lexicon: Transparency, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Oct. 3, 2010, 11:00 AM), 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2010/10/legal-theory-lexicon-transparency.html. 
 43. See, e.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 35; Mark Fenster, Opacity, supra note 31, at 910–14 
(describing the balance between benefits and limitations in conceptions of transparency); Mark 
Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 42; Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339 (2011). 
 44. See generally Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 42. 
 45. See, e.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 35, at 25–27. 
 46. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009). 
 47. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
754 (1989); PELTZ-STEELE, supra note 6, at 127. 
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has to base any denial of information.48 Under FOIA, any person may 
request access to identifiable, existing government records without 
providing an explanation or a justification.49 A second, related change 
was that access was no longer limited to individuals with a particular 
need.50 
The basic purpose of FOIA was “to ensure that the [g]overnment’s 
activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny.”51 Ruling on the 
disclosure of a criminal rap sheet in U.S. Department of Justice v. Re-
porters Committee for the Freedom of the Press, the U.S. Supreme Court 
described the purpose of the Act as follows: 
Justice Douglas characterized the philosophy of the statute by quot-
ing this comment by Henry Steele Commager: “The generation that 
made the nation thought secrecy in government one of the instru-
ments of Old World tyranny and committed itself to the principle 
that a democracy cannot function unless the people are permitted to 
know what their government is up to.” This basic policy of “full 
agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly de-
lineated statutory language” . . . indeed focuses on the citizens’ right 
to be informed about “what their government is up to.” Official in-
formation that sheds light on an agency’s performance of its statuto-
ry duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose.52 
Reflecting the Court’s interpretation of FOIA, right-to-know trans-
parency is typically viewed as a condition of democratic accountability. 
To the extent that the people are sovereign, government must be ac-
countable and responsive to the people. And the ability to hold govern-
ment officials to account and to assess their responsiveness presupposes 
that the people know “what their government is up to.”53 
The right to know what government is up to might be said to reflect 
the theory of distrust that informs American democracy. Arguments for a 
constitutional basis for such a right point to the Founding Fathers’ in-
tense concern about how to prevent the corruption of the Republic.54 This 
                                                 
 48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2009); PELTZ-STEELE, supra note 6, at 129. 
 49. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 
(1989). 
 50. Id. at 770 (“The identity of the requesting party has no bearing on the merits of his or her 
FOIA request.”). 
 51. Id. at 774. 
 52. Id. at 772 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 53. Id. (“This basic policy of ‘full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under 
clearly delineated statutory language,’ indeed focuses on the citizens’ right to be informed about 
‘what their government is up to.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965)). 
 54. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 299 (1998). 
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concern is reflected in the constitutional structure, including not only in 
the separation and division of powers, but also in direct proscriptions of 
graft, such as the Gifts and Emoluments Clause. 55  The Publications 
Clause56 reflects this same idea. According to Justice Story, “[t]he object 
of the whole clause is to ensure publicity to the proceedings of the legis-
lature, and a correspondent responsibility of the members to their respec-
tive constituents.”57 
This purpose can be understood in terms of agency law, which in-
forms our constitutional structure.58 Accountability entails both the act of 
an agent to provide information to his principal (about money spent, 
debts incurred, and actions taken), as well as the condition of being sub-
ject to the control of the principal.59 We can think of the principal’s con-
trol over his agent as dependent upon the principal’s right to monitor the 
agent.60 
To this end, the federal government also passed certain open meet-
ing laws. In 1976, Congress passed the Government in the Sunshine Act, 
which required that certain government meetings be open by default.61 
Here too the legislative intent was to establish accountability: 
The basic premise of the sunshine legislation is that, in the words of 
Federalist 49, “the people are the only legitimate foundation of 
power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter . . . is de-
rived.” Government is and should be the servant of the people, and 
                                                 
 55. “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any 
Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any pre-
sent, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.” 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 341, 443–73 (2009) (discussing constitutional provisions that reflect the anticorruption con-
cern). 
 56. See, for example, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 31, which provides that “Each House shall 
keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same . . . and the Yeas and Nays 
of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be 
entered on the Journal.” 
 57. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 838 
(1833), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_5s21.html. 
 58. See generally Akheel Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987). 
 59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). 
 60. Lloyd Mayer has raised problems with this view, noting that just as shareholders of a cor-
poration do not ordinarily have the right to access information about a corporations operations and 
decisions—this is the job of the board—citizens in a representative government also do not have 
such an absolute right. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics and the Public’s Right to Know, 13 ELECTION 
L.J. 138, 145–46 (2014). 
 61. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2009). See also Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, 5 U.S.C. app. 
2, §§ 1–16 (2014). 
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it should be fully accountable to them for the actions which it sup-
posedly takes on their behalf.62 
Every state has adopted its own public records and open meetings laws.63 
Simplifying the different historical strands of such right-to-know 
transparency, I maintain that its principal purpose, as it emerged in the 
1970s in the wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate, has been as a tool 
of government accountability and anticorruption. 64  To recall Peltz-
Steele’s observation, “[t]ransparency is a sine qua non of democracy, 
hand in hand with free speech and fair elections,”65 in that it enables citi-
zens to discuss and assess the performance of elected officials and hold 
them accountable at the ballot box.66 
Twentieth century open government laws that rely on right-to-know 
justifications have the following characteristics. Conventional open gov-
ernment, or right-to-know law, is characterized by passivity on the part 
of government.67 Freedom of information laws require government to 
respond to specific inquiries for particular government records.68 The 
communication is typically a one-to-one communication. The infor-
mation comes from government and is produced to a single party. The 
communication is a one-way street. Government does not obtain any in-
formation by means of freedom of information requests. While records 
may be requested online this does not generate any network effects for 
government operations. Moreover, government typically does not change 
its procedures in response to such requests. The processing of freedom of 
                                                 
 62. H.R. Rep. No. 94-880(I), at 2 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2186. See 
also the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 92 P.L. 463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972). 
 63. State open meeting / sunshine laws are generally much more sweeping than the limited 
federal open meeting laws. The Delaware FOI, for example, gives presumptive access to “infor-
mation of any kind, owned, made, used, retained, received, produced, composed, drafted or other-
wise compiled or collected, by any public body, relating in any way to public business, or in any 
way of public interest, or in any way related to public purposes, regardless of the physical form or 
characteristic by which such information is stored, recorded or reproduced.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, 
§ 10002(l) (2014). New York’s open meeting laws, for example, presumptively open all state and 
local government meetings to public scrutiny, subject to enumerated exceptions. N.Y. PUB. OFF. 
LAW § 84–90 (McKinney 1977). 
 64. Anthony Kronman, The Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 727, 733 (1980) (“The [A]ct’s first and most obvious goal (reflected in its basic disclosure 
requirements) is to promote honesty and reduce waste in government by exposing official conduct to 
public scrutiny.”). 
 65. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 66. Right-to-know laws were supported by such discourse theory arguments. See Thomas L. 
Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right To Know, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 4 (discussing Alexander 
Meiklejohn’s First Amendment theory). 
 67. FUNG ET AL., supra note 35, at 28 (“[R]ight-to-know policies required simply that existing 
government reports and other documents be made available to the public.”). 
 68. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(3)(A) (2009). 
2015] Election Reform from an Open Government Perspective 1019 
information requests is separate from government policymaking—a kind 
of service offered to citizens. The primary purpose of open records laws 
is to hold government officials accountable for their actions.69 But they 
do not encourage participation in government decisionmaking in and of 
themselves, nor do open record or open meeting laws aim to change or 
improve government—at least not directly. However, publicity generated 
by the media or litigation as a result of a freedom of information request 
may ultimately affect government behavior. The same is true for open 
meeting laws. They are not aimed at changing or improving government 
or encouraging public participation, but at providing a window on gov-
ernment decisionmaking processes. 70  Additionally, like open records 
laws, open meeting laws provide access to existing information. Gov-
ernment generally does not produce additional information to those who 
attend meetings, except notices and minutes of what transpired. Right-to-
know transparency is post hoc, in the sense that its principal purpose is 
the ability to assign responsibility for (undesirable) consequences of spe-
cific decisions to specific government actors. 
Freedom of information laws naturally raise concerns about privi-
leged information in the hands of government, including national securi-
ty purposes, law enforcement, internal government decisionmaking, or 
the administration of programs affecting private individuals and firms. 
The traditional open government law is thus accompanied by exemptions 
and privacy protections that are both part of freedom of information and 
sunshine laws themselves, but also separately codified. 
FOIA’s practice has been geared towards the production of individ-
ual documents or limited quantities of documents, but not a routine pro-
duction of data. The Privacy Act of 1974, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a, 
was passed out of concern over “the impact of computer data banks on 
                                                 
 69. Supra notes 52–57. 
 70. Note that more recently, and in light of the changing conception of Open Government, 
courts have begun to include “participation” in government decisionmaking as a purpose of open 
meeting laws. Thus, in Garlock v. Wake County Board of Education, 712 S.E.2d 158 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2011), the North Carolina Court of Appeals falsely cited Gutierrez v. City of Albuquerque, 631 P.2d 
304 (N.M. 1981) for the proposition that open meeting laws, like North Carolina’s, inter alia, “en-
sure that public bodies receive public input regarding the substance of the public body’s actions.” 
Garlock, 712 S.E.2d at 173. Neither Gutierrez, nor the N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.9–.18 (2013) 
warrant such an interpretation. See Cassandra B. Roeder, Note, Transparency Trumps Technology: 
Reconciling Open Meeting Laws with Modern Technology, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2287, 2293–94 
(2014) (recognizing that “although some states protect the public’s right to speak at open meetings, 
many do not require that meeting attendees be given an opportunity to express opinions or ask ques-
tions,” but failing to distinguish between recent court decisions and older decisions on the purpose of 
open meeting laws). 
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individual privacy.”71 In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court em-
phasizes a “level of federal concern over centralized data bases,”72 which 
suggests that open government as freedom of information does not natu-
rally support open data projects. Right-to-know transparency is at best 
imagined as offering a window on government decisionmaking. 
B. Transparency as Regulation / Mandatory Disclosure 
The term “transparency as regulation” refers to the disclosure re-
gimes imposed on private (and sometimes public)73 actors by federal and 
state administrative agencies, like the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Food and Drug 
Administration, to obtain information they require to satisfy their regula-
tory missions.74 
The classic example of such regulations is the federal securities 
laws. They require that companies that offer securities for sale to the 
public register with the SEC and file a registration statement and a copy 
of their offering prospectus.75 The SEC rules lay out in detail what finan-
cial, business, management, and other information must be disclosed in 
standardized SEC filings.76 The filings are made available to the general 
public.77 After the initial public offering, issuers are required to continue 
periodic and special disclosure of company information for as long as 
they exist as public companies. Securities issuers may be subject to civil 
or criminal enforcement if they violate their disclosure obligations.78 
Disclosure requirements are called “soft regulation” because they 
merely require the disclosure of conduct instead of regulating it in detail. 
Instead of prescribing a certain debt-equity ratio, for example, the SEC 
merely requires that a public company publish its debt-equity ratio accu-
rately and in a timely fashion.79 In securities disclosure, food labeling, 
home mortgage loan disclosure, auto safety ratings, and many other are-
                                                 
 71. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 766 
(1989). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 34 (describing how OIRA monitors federal government 
agencies by means of standardized information disclosure). 
 74. I borrow the term from Schauer, supra note 31. 
 75. See Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77e–g 
(2012)). 
 76. SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10–.1208 (2015). 
 77. See EDGAR Search Tools, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/ 
searchedgar/webusers.htm#.VNGJZUuxFpW (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). 
 78. Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Dessler, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1377 (1980). 
 79. William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 
171, 171 (1933). 
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as, regulatory disclosure allows consumers to make their own choices. 
But it works to improve those choices by reducing information asymme-
tries among market participants.80 Disclosure regimes are thus best un-
derstood as welfare enhancing, instead of rights enforcing. Shareholders 
do not have an independent right to such detailed information about a 
company in which they own only a small minority share. Rather, gov-
ernment here uses disclosure regimes to improve the efficiency of mar-
kets and avoid market failure.81 
Basic information economics explains how information asymme-
tries affect the efficiency of markets. George Akerlof’s Market for Lem-
ons provides one explanation based on information asymmetry.82 To the 
extent that there is a substantial information asymmetry between sellers 
of used cars (who know from experience over time whether their vehicle 
is good) and buyers of used cars (who do not have such private infor-
mation), buyers take the risk of getting a “lemon” that saddles them with 
ongoing costly repairs. Theoretically, the purchaser’s risk associated with 
lack of information about the car, and the superior information of the 
seller or dealer, will be reflected in the used car dealer’s anticipated price 
for such used cars—whether poorly or well-maintained. The purchaser 
will expect a discount for taking on the additional risk of buying in the 
used car market. And the seller of good cars will have a difficult time 
getting a fair price because buyers, who cannot distinguish good vehicles 
from bad ones, will only be willing to pay the average price. Sellers of 
good vehicles may thus refrain from selling their vehicles. This, in turn, 
means that more bad cars are sold in the market, which drives down the 
average price. This problem of “adverse selection,” where the bad drives 
out the good, leads to fewer transactions and an inefficient market. Col-
lective action by used car dealers to self-regulate, or by government to 
require used car dealers to standardize information disclosure in such a 
market, should increase social welfare, benefitting both the buyers and 
the sellers. 
Government plays an important role in maintaining efficient mar-
kets by instituting such information pushing regimes. Securities disclo-
sure, for example, makes securities markets more efficient by reducing 
information asymmetries between insiders and investors. This also low-
ers the transaction costs on the securities markets because buyers and 
                                                 
 80. FUNG ET AL., supra note 35, at 30. 
 81. See generally John C. Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984). 
 82. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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sellers save on the cost of searching for and generating this information. 
And it facilitates price finding because buyers and sellers have the same 
information. Overall, the more efficient the securities and financial mar-
kets are, the lower the cost of capital for entrepreneurs and corporations. 
The market cannot supply this information without some form of 
collective action. Basic information economics holds that knowledge and 
information have public goods characteristics.83 Pure public goods are 
characterized by nonrivalrous consumption, meaning “that the consump-
tion of the good by one individual does not detract from the ability of 
others to enjoy its consumption.”84 Second, pure public goods are nonex-
clusive, meaning that it is difficult to exclude an individual from enjoy-
ing the good. One consequence is that public goods, like information, 
tend to be underproduced in markets because producers have little incen-
tive to invest unrecoverable resources in their production.85 Information 
economics thus recognizes that government must step in to help generate 
this information. Our government, in fact, does so. But it does not neces-
sarily “create” the information. Rather, disclosure regimes, like securities 
disclosure, leave the information production to the decentralized market 
actors. 86  Depending on the circumstances, government often merely 
compels it.87 
For these reasons, disclosure requirements are better understood as 
welfare-based, rather than rights-based. Archon Fung and coauthors de-
scribe mandatory disclosure regimes as a form of “targeted transparen-
cy.”88 They write that “[i]nstead of aiming to generally improve public 
deliberation and officials’ accountability[,] . . . targeted transparency 
aims to reduce specific risks or performance problems through selective 
disclosure by corporations and organizations.”89 Targeted transparency 
regimes all include “mandated public disclosure . . . by corporations or 
other private or public organizations . . . of standardized comparable, and 
                                                 
 83. See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm 
Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. L. REV. 1123, 1168 (2007). 
See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc 
Stern eds., 1999). 
 84. Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 83, at 1168. 
 85. Id. For a succinct summary of these ideas, see FUNG ET AL., supra note 35, at 30–31. 
 86. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 81 (addressing the role of analysts in rendering securities 
markets more efficient by disseminating the company disclosures that are publicized by the SEC). 
 87. An example is securities disclosure. See FUNG ET AL., supra note 35, at 12–13 for examples 
of such compelled disclosures. 
 88. FUNG ET AL., supra note 35, at 6. 
 89. Id. at 5. 
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disaggregated information . . . regarding specific products or practic-
es . . . to further a defined public purpose.”90 
An important feature of disclosure regimes is that they work to alter 
the “chain reaction of new incentives” between producers and consumers 
of the information.91 Information users perceive and understand newly 
disclosed information and therefore choose safer, healthier, or better 
quality goods and services. Information disclosers perceive and under-
stand users’ changed choices and therefore improve practices or prod-
ucts.92 That in turn reduces risks or improves services. 
Fung and coauthors also suggest that targeted transparency regula-
tion makes government more democratic: 
[T]argeted transparency aims to reduce specific risks or perfor-
mance problems through selective disclosure by corporations and 
other organizations. The ingeniousness of targeted transparency lies 
in its mobilization of individual choice, market forces, and partici-
patory democracy through relatively light-handed government ac-
tion.93 
But in doing so, Fung and coauthors assimilate disclosure regimes 
to what I call Open Government.94 This leads them to overlook important 
differences. Characterizing mandatory disclosure as democratic is too 
strong. Mandatory disclosure regimes do not necessarily encourage par-
ticipation in self-governance. Rather, they represent a technocratic solu-
tion to regulation, which does not depend on a theory of democratic ac-
countability or participation in self-governance. Disclosure regimes serve 
as tools by which modern bureaucracies satisfy their information re-
quirements, monitor private actors, regulate markets, enforce regulations, 
and inform consumers about their choices. 
Mandated disclosure fulfills another critical purpose as well. Com-
bined with statutes criminalizing intentional misrepresentation, mandato-
ry disclosure regimes may provide a basis for prosecuting misconduct 
that would otherwise be much harder to target or that is not easily distin-
guished from legal conduct. Disclosure regimes thus serve as an en-
forcement tool. For example, security disclosure violations are proxies 
for defrauding investors. Reasonable campaign finance disclosure regula-
                                                 
 90. Id. at 6. 
 91. Id. at 2. 
 92. Id. at 6. 
 93. Id. at 5. 
 94. Fung and coauthors instead distinguish between second-generation targeted transparency 
(mandatory disclosure), and third-generation targeted transparency (which more closely resembles 
what I describe as Open Government). Id. at 151ff. 
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tions help distinguish legal contributions from contributions that are in-
tended to corruptly influence elected officials. Below, we discuss how 
this type of ex post use of disclosure might serve as a basis enforcing 
voting rights,95 as proposed by Professor Samuel Issacharoff.96 
Mandated disclosure regimes are also sometimes justified in terms 
of a right to know. In the area of environmental legislation, for example, 
advocates speak of a right to know what toxic substances workers97 or 
their communities will be exposed to.98 This characterization of mandat-
ed disclosure reflects the view that those negatively affected by the be-
havior of others—shareholders in the case of management misconduct or 
residents in the case of the EPA’s mandated toxic release disclosure—
should have the information to press their interests.99 
In sum, disclosure regimes are information pushing regimes. Dis-
closure of this kind is self-executing in the sense that it is not dependent 
upon a specific request for information. Typically those subject to disclo-
sure are non-governmental organizations or individuals. Disclosure re-
gimes help address market failures, aid consumer choice, and satisfy the 
information requirements of government regulatory agencies. Regulation 
as disclosure is also used by government to force actors it cannot con-
trol—or does not wish to control directly—to disclose information relat-
ed to performance measurement or regulatory compliance. The purpose 
of mandatory disclosure is often welfare enhancing. Contrary to the open 
records and open meeting laws, the purpose of mandatory disclosure re-
gimes is not primarily to afford the public access to government infor-
mation.100 But mandatory disclosure regimes are similar to right-to-know 
transparency in that they can help individuals hold large (private) organi-
zations accountable for their actions. 
                                                 
 95. See infra notes 265–270 and accompanying text. 
 96. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 95 (2013). 
 97. OSHA Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2015). FUNG ET AL., supra note 
35, use this example. 
 98. See generally SUSAN G. HADDEN, A CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO KNOW: RISK COMMUNICATION 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1989). 
 99. This makes sense, for example, on Ian Shapiro’s theory of democracy as the ability to 
participate in decisions that affect you. See generally IAN SHAPIRO, CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY (2002). 
 100. For example, the general public had very limited access to securities disclosures until the 
SEC’s online EDGAR system was set up to publish mandatory disclosures on the internet. The 
SEC’s online system was adopted only after David Malamud created a third party website that pub-
lished the SEC filings. 
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C. Transparency in Rulemaking 
Transparency in rulemaking is separate from right to know and dis-
closure as regulation. Transparency in rulemaking does share with trans-
parency as disclosure the general goal of satisfying the regulator’s infor-
mation requirements. In writing regulations that do not disrupt private 
orderings unduly or conflict with other duties on the part of private ac-
tors, the regulator must obtain detailed feedback from differently situated 
private actors with access to “local knowledge.” 101  Transparency in 
rulemaking also shares with targeted transparency the broader goal of 
increasing market efficiency. And the rules that are written ultimately 
may affect information disclosure by market participants. But given the 
important differences in function, practice, and the entity regulated (here, 
the regulator’s procedures are to comply with the APA), it is helpful to 
separate transparency in rulemaking from mandatory disclosure. 
Transparency in rulemaking is aimed at affording private actors the 
opportunity to influence the rulemaking process directly. Whereas legis-
lators have no legal duty to hear or respond to constituents, the rulemak-
ing and comment process set forth in the APA requires that regulatory 
agencies like the SEC publish proposed rules and allow the public (and 
in particular those who will be affected by the rules) to comment on 
them.102 The regulator may then publicly respond to these comments and 
explain how the comments have been taken into account in the final 
adopted rules.103 
Transparency in rulemaking thus allows for participation in gov-
ernment decisionmaking. It cannot be assimilated to the concept of the 
right to know because the right to know does not extend to a right to 
comment or to have one’s feedback considered. It also is distinguishable 
from transparency as regulation because it does not require disclosures or 
                                                 
 101. Michael Halberstam & Stuart Lazar, Business Lobbying as an Informational Public Good: 
Can Tax Deductions for Lobbying Expenses Promote Transparency?, 13 ELECTION L.J. 91, 97 
(2014) (“Knowledge of markets, business conditions, and the effects of government action on thou-
sands of different industries across the country (with customers and production facilities around the 
globe) are essential to the intelligent regulation of markets.” (citing Joseph Stiglitz, Information and 
the Change in Paradigm in Economics, in SELECTED WORKS OF JOSEPH STIGLITZ, VOL. I 53, 62ff 
(2009) for the proposition that the standard, competitive, general equilibrium approach to market 
failure does not account for the “myriad of other information problems faced by consumers and 
firms every day.”)). 
 102. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2014). 
 103. Id. But the agencies are free to decide upon their own notice and comment procedure and 
are not required to respond to comments. See Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in 
Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 454–55 (2004). 
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comments from private actors, nor is it primarily geared at monitoring, 
enforcement, or informing markets.104 
D. Transparency as Open Government 
The Open Government movement grows out of the digital revolu-
tion of the twenty-first century, which has transformed markets, modes 
of production, work routines, organizational management, social net-
working, and leisure activities. Online services like Wikipedia, Face-
book, Google, eBay, and Amazon have helped drive these changes, using 
so-called Web 2.0 technologies for harnessing the voluntary collabora-
tion and creativity of users in cocreating their services.105 Their commer-
cialization has generated powerful new business models. The Open Gov-
ernment movement seeks to harness these new forms to “fundamentally 
redesign how government operates; how and what the public sector pro-
vides; and ultimately, how government interacts and engages with its 
citizens.”106 
This Open Government ideal has moved far beyond the standard 
paradigm of open records and open meeting laws. The purpose of Open 
Government is not primarily accountability or anticorruption, but public 
and private sector participation in government operations and problem 
solving.107 The aims and methods, however, are not those of traditional 
                                                 
 104. Transparency is an increasingly important topic in administrative law because simple, 
traditional rulemaking and comment transparency is being rethought and developed into something 
more expansive by applying Open Government tools and strategies, described in greater detail be-
low. Id. See also Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Politi-
cal Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 894 n.1 (2006) (citing literature). The Cornell eRulemaking Initi-
ative (CeRI) is working on various projects, including a project called the “Regulation Room,” 
which it describes as an “experimental platform” that uses real-time rulemaking to experiment with 
online, technology-assisted, public participation in rulemaking “for effective Rulemaking 2.0 sys-
tems.” Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 395 (2011). For a discus-
sion of this project, see generally Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: 
Social Networking and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 31 PACE L. REV. 382 (2011). 
 105. Web 2.0 primarily refers to new interactive capabilities of the World Wide Web, social 
media tools, open source codes, third-party app development, and the development of non-SQL 
databases developed by Google and Facebook that are capable of integrating vast amounts of differ-
ent types of data. See Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0, O’REILLY.COM (Sept. 20, 2005), 
http://www.oreilly.com/pub/a/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html. 
 106. LATHROP & RUMA, OPEN GOVERNMENT, supra note 1, at 16. 
 107. In its notable 2009 Open Government Directive, the Obama White House described the 
principles of Open Government as follows:  
The three principles of transparency, participation, and collaboration form the corner-
stone of an open government. Transparency promotes accountability by providing the 
public with information about what the Government is doing. Participation allows mem-
bers of the public to contribute ideas and expertise so that their government can make 
policies with the benefit of information that is widely dispersed in society. Collaboration 
improves the effectiveness of Government by encouraging partnerships and cooperation 
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privatization (although a Trojan Horse problem is admitted here). They 
are to benefit government operations, as well as markets, from what 
Yochai Benkler, for example, calls the “networked information econo-
my.”108 
The networked information economy is characterized, inter alia, 
by: the “open by default” structure of information sharing on the Web (a 
mere click away); the dramatic decentralization of the means of infor-
mation production (from big media to every networked computer); the 
voluntary (e.g., Wikipedia, Amazon ratings) and involuntary (e.g., data 
mining) cocreation of knowledge and information (the most important 
products in an information/knowledge economy); and the rapid innova-
tion that this environment engenders (e.g., apps). The networked infor-
mation economy generates a “new economic logic”109 that changes the 
incentives of market and nonmarket actors. 
Instead of opening a window on government operations, Open 
Government is envisioned as a “government without walls.”110 Rather 
than simple, passive transparency for the sake of accountability, or tradi-
tional disclosure regimes that enable consumer choice, the Open Gov-
ernment model requires that government agencies actively share internal 
government information with the public in digital formats that invite am-
plification by users and encourage collaboration in government problem 
solving. 
From budget and spending data, to public health data and subway 
train arrival information,111 governments are to share such data “by de-
fault” and in real-time where appropriate.112 Governments are to enable 
                                                                                                             
within the Federal Government, across levels of government, and between the Govern-
ment and private institutions. 
Open Government Memorandum, supra note 41, at 1. 
 108. BENKLER, supra note 16, at 32. 
 109. Don Tapscott and Anthony Williams have colloquially dubbed this “Wikinomics.” See 
generally DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS COLLABORATION 
CHANGES EVERYTHING (2006). 
 110. EGGERS, supra note 13, at 17. 
 111 . See, e.g., Introducing MTA Subway Time® App, METRO. TRANSP. AUTH., 
http://web.mta.info/apps/subwaytimeapp.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). 
 112 . See generally, e.g., SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION, GUIDELINES FOR OPEN DATA POLICIES 
(2014), available at http://assets.sunlightfoundation.com/policy/Open%20Data%20Policy%20 
Guidelines/OpenDataGuidelines_v3.pdf. The executive branches of New York City, St. Louis, and 
other cities have passed executive orders to institute such a policy. See, for example, the New York 
City DoITT statement of purpose: “In the past the practice for most institutions, government or 
otherwise, was keep information closed save for those few exceptions that were made public. The 
City is working to turn this idea on its head, believing that data and information should be open by 
default unless there is a compelling reason to keep it closed.” Technology & Public Service Innova-
tion, NYC INFO., TECH. & TELECOMM., http://www.nyc.gov/html/doitt/html/open/open.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2015). 
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general audiences (i.e., citizens) or specialized audiences (i.e., public 
interest groups), and governmental actors, to interface directly with the 
operations of a particular governmental unit to promote innovation, 
knowledge sharing, and intergovernmental and public–private collabora-
tion in social problem solving. In its most idealistic formulation, Open 
Government is intended to transform our current industrial age bureau-
cracy into a digital age “platform” for information sharing and collabora-
tion in the solution of collective action problems.113 
The general public is engaged, mostly at the local level, by means 
of civic technologies provided directly by government or by third-party 
developers.114 At the state and federal levels, more sophisticated inter-
mediaries—NGOs, public interest groups, private sector businesses, aca-
demic researchers, software developers, and other government agen-
cies—are expected to download government data in the form of stand-
ardized data sets, accessible without proprietary software, and to use the 
data to develop services.115 In either case, users are, in turn, expected to 
generate additional data valuable for the provision of public goods and 
services by means of crowdsourcing, user tracking, and data analytics.116 
Finally, Open Government goes beyond the currently limited public 
participation in the regulatory process. It seeks to extend public partici-
pation across government operations. Open Government in regulation is 
already evidenced in online sharing of public comments, but it goes fur-
ther to seek more comprehensive data sharing, and the application of 
online social media tools to the public notice and comment process. 
Federal, state, and local governments are presently implementing 
Open Government projects across the country at considerable cost. The 
federal government and many state and local governments have already 
adopted “open by default” goals for various kinds of data.117 A few nota-
                                                 
 113. O’Reilly, supra note 8, at 12–13. See also EGGERS, supra note 13, at 32, 234. 
 114. See generally MAYUR PATEL ET AL., THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL TECH: INVESTMENTS IN A 
GROWING FIELD (2013). 
 115. See generally U.S. GEN. SERV. ADMIN., supra note 41, at 4 (“Noting that open data has 
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 116. William D. Eggers & Rob Hamill, Five Ways Crowdsourcing Can Change the Public 
Sphere, GOVERNING THE STATES AND LOCALITIES (May 23, 2012), 
http://www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/col-government-crowdsourcing-five-
models.html; O’Reilly, supra note 8, at 34–35. 
 117. See, e.g., Digital Government: Building a 21st Century Platform to Better Serve the Amer-
ican People, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/egov/digital-
government/digital-government.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2015) (“To lay the foundation for opening 
data and content efficiently, effectively and accessibly, OMB will work with representatives from 
across government to develop and publish an open data, content, and web API policy for the Federal 
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ble developments are President Obama’s ongoing Open Government Ini-
tiative,118 New York City’s “open by default” policy,119 and the rapid 
emergence of a new civic technologies sector.120 
The Open Government movement combines ideas from (at least) 
three different fields.121 First, it seeks to improve government through 
twenty-first century information technologies.122 These technologies in-
clude the second-generation Internet, interactive websites, social media, 
application interfaces for app development, and data mining, which are 
sometimes referred to collectively as “Web 2.0.”123 
Second, it draws on information economics, the economics of net-
works, and economic thinking about the “networked information econo-
my.”124 In other words, it takes a welfarist approach to questions of gov-
ernment transparency, an approach that has a long tradition dating back 
to Jeremy Bentham’s ideas about the importance of publicity in legisla-
tion and governance.125 
Third, Open Government advocates claim the mantle of “participa-
tory democracy,”126 a political philosophy that believes democracy and 
individual freedom require the active participation of citizens in self-
                                                                                                             
Government. . . . To establish a “new default,” the policy will require that newly developed IT sys-
tems are architected for openness and expose high-value data and content as web APIs at a discrete 
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 121. This conceptualization of Open Government is a helpful heuristic, but, like all such classi-
fication efforts, it is most certainly incomplete. 
 122. O’Reilly, supra note 8, at 11. 
 123. See generally PATRICIA E. SALKIN & JULIE A. TAPPENDORF, SOCIAL MEDIA AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS: NAVIGATING THE NEW PUBLIC SQUARE (2013); ALAN R. SHARK, CIO LEADERSHIP 
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 124. See BENKLER, supra note 16, at 35–133 (setting forth principles of the networked infor-
mation economy); FUNG ET AL., supra note 35, at 31–33; See generally TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, 
supra note 109 (describing principles of the networked information economy). 
 125. See Guyora Binder & Nicholas Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the 
Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 115, 200ff (2001). 
 126. See O’Reilly, supra note 8, at 12. 
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governance. The theory was revived in the 1960s in the wake of the civil 
rights movement and the Great Society programs of the 1960s,127 and 
became a self-conscious practice of community organizers, grassroots 
activists, and public interest groups during the 1970s and 1980s.128 The 
theory has deep roots in American pragmatism and in John Dewey’s 
conception of democratic experimentalism.129 
Tim O’Reilly’s 2010 essay, Government as a Platform, offers an 
idealistic account of this approach to democratic governance.130 Accord-
ing to O’Reilly, government should be less like a vending machine for 
dispensing public goods and services, and more of a Facebook-like “plat-
form” for involving citizens, social entrepreneurs, NGOs, and the private 
sector in collective problem solving.131 Government should be “stripped 
down” to its essential function as a mechanism for collective action.132 
“Platform thinking” reconceives government as “a convener and an ena-
bler rather than a first mover of civic action.”133 “Government 2.0, then, 
is the use of technology—especially the collaborative technologies at the 
heart of Web 2.0—to better solve collective problems at a city, state, na-
tional, and international level.”134 
Characteristic features of transparency as Open Government are as 
follows: 
1. A shift from passive, post-hoc government transparency to ac-
tive, near real-time information sharing by government via the 
Internet. 
                                                 
 127. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1960); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION 
AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY I-44 (1970); Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1059 (1980). See also THE DEMOCRACY SOURCEBOOK (Robert A. Dahl & Ian Shapiro eds., 
2003). 
 128. For example, see Ralph Nader’s efforts to create Public Interest Research Groups. 
 129. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, in 2 JOHN DEWEY, THE LATER WORKS, 1925–
1953, at 235, 327–28 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1984) (“From the standpoint of the individual, it con-
sists in having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the 
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sustain. From the standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members of 
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Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) for an attempt 
to adapt Dewey’s approach to the design of contemporary problem-solving institutions. 
 130. 6 INNOVATIONS: TECHNOLOGY, GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 13 (Philip E. Auerswald 
ed., 2011). 
 131. O’Reilly, supra note 8, at 13. 
 132. Id. at 38. 
 133. Id. at 12. 
 134. Id. 
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2. A shift from a focus on rights and accountability to a focus on 
improving government operations and public welfare by means 
of Web 2.0 tools and dynamics.135 
3. A shift from one-to-one communication between a government 
and a private entity and one-to-many communications (like the 
posting of SEC filings), to many-to-many communications. 
4. The creation of Open Data portals that allow users to download 
existing government data and extract value from it. 
5. The creation of platforms for collaboration (like CeRi’s Regula-
tion Room) that incorporate social media. 
6. The development of online civic technologies that serve as plat-
forms for user-centered interactions with government and offer 
opportunities for involving citizens (either voluntarily or invol-
untarily) in government problem solving. 
E. Summary 
We have distinguished between four different types of transparen-
cy: (1) transparency as the right to know, (2) transparency as regulation, 
(3) transparency in rulemaking, and (4) transparency as Open Govern-
ment. 
The right to know addresses the republican concern about govern-
ment accountability and corruption. The right to know has been imple-
mented by twentieth-century Open Government laws—such as open rec-
ords and open meeting laws—that offer a window on “what the govern-
ment is up to.” It is distinct from the contemporary Open Government 
movement, which contemplates an open door policy—or even a “gov-
ernment without walls”—that shares information to enable public partic-
ipation in government problem solving. The goal of contemporary Open 
Government is not primarily to curb government corruption or hold gov-
ernment accountable, but to increase social welfare. 
Transparency as regulation refers to mandated disclosure regimes 
that target private (but also government) actors in order to obtain stand-
ardized information about their performance. The purpose is to satisfy 
the information requirements of public administrative agencies and mar-
kets, but also to serve as a basis for deterring misbehavior. To the extent 
that the goal of such disclosure is welfare enhancing, it is similar to the 
goals of contemporary Open Government. But the mechanism by which 
                                                 
 135. Yu & Robinson, supra note 8, at 181–82 (recognizing that the “new open government” is 
not aimed primarily at “accountability”). 
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it does so, i.e., affecting consumer choice, is different from contemporary 
Open Government in that the latter is concerned with making govern-
ment production more efficient and innovative through citizen and inter-
governmental collaboration. 
Transparency in rulemaking comes closest to the goals of contem-
porary Open Government, in that the notice and comment process seeks 
public participation in one aspect of government operations. In the area 
of rulemaking, contemporary Open Government efforts have indeed been 
introduced. But, in and of itself, such regulatory participation does not 
necessarily lead to broader information sharing by government, or to col-
laboration in improving the efficiency of government operations.136 And 
the recent developments in information technology and social media that 
the eRulemaking movement wants government to take advantage of in-
deed represent a “revolution in rulemaking.”137 
In the election law context, the shift from ex post litigation to fixing 
election administration ex ante reflects a kind of shift from rights to wel-
fare, to the extent that election administrators are helped to do more with 
less. But because there are no markets for the election services of gov-
ernment officials, it is better to speak of a shift from rights to a focus on 
improving election operations. 
III. OPEN GOVERNMENT IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 
Since the 2000 presidential election, the election law community 
has moved from a civil rights approach, centered around litigation in the 
courts, to a problem-solving approach, focused on improving operational 
aspects of election administration. Professor Gerken’s book, The Democ-
racy Index: Why Our Election System is Broken and How to Fix It, marks 
this shift “away from traditional civil-rights rhetoric toward a results-
oriented, data-driven approach” to election reform.138 Gerken’s Democ-
racy Index shares the turn towards operations and a data-driven approach 
with Open Government.139 But ultimately her project is best character-
ized as a right to know or a regulatory transparency approach. In the fol-
lowing, I contrast the Democracy Index with the Pew Center for Democ-
racy in the states’ voter registration project, which I describe as a new 
open data approach. 
                                                 
 136. Beth Simone Noveck, Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 434 
(2002). 
 137. Id. at 434–35. 
 138. GERKEN, supra note 2, at 111. 
 139. Id. at 38ff, 111. 
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A. The Democracy Index 
Professor Gerken’s “institutionalist” approach proposes to generate 
information about the performance of election administration in every 
jurisdiction in the country.140  This information is used to compose a 
“Democracy Index” (Index) that compares and ranks state and local ju-
risdictions based on their performance.141 By standardizing performance 
measurement across state and local jurisdictions, the Index is intended to 
expose problems, such as excessively long polling lines, malfunctions of 
electronic voting systems, inaccurate or incomplete voter registration 
rolls, untrained poll workers, or poll workers who fail to show up to 
work.142 It should also help identify best practices by identifying the most 
successful jurisdictions. Accordingly, the Index can lay the groundwork 
for reform by helping government decide how to allocate resources. The 
rankings, it is hoped, will also put pressure on government officials and 
politicians to direct their attention to fixing election systems. 143  “By 
providing the right information in the right form,” as Professor Gerken 
puts it, there is “potential to create an environment that is receptive to 
change. It is a data-driven, information-forcing device designed to gener-
ate pressure for reform while helping us make more sensible choices 
about which reforms to pursue.”144 
One of the main conclusions that emerges from Professor Gerken’s 
work is that we lack data about election administration performance. The 
Index is a call for such data.145 In part, the Index’s function is to generate 
transparency about failures and make it possible for voters to hold juris-
dictions accountable for them.146 This function of the Index can be un-
derstood as traditional public information or a right to know project that 
can drive reforms by publicizing failures to voters and thus incentivizing 
politicians to change their behavior. If jurisdictions are forced to produce 
the performance data in standardized formats and disclose such data to 
the public, we might also conceive of the project as a transparency-as-
regulation project, or to use Fung’s term, as a targeted transparency pro-
ject. 
The Index is also a device to overcome institutional and political 
resistance to reform. The “hyper-decentralization” of election administra-
                                                 
 140. Id. at 34. 
 141. Id. at 25–36. 
 142. Id. at 13. 
 143. Id. at 25–26. 
 144. Id. at 5. 
 145. Id. at 43–44, 57. 
 146. Gerken notes that the Democracy Index could also be considered a kind of “Transparency 
Index.” Id. at 113. 
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tion provides one of the main institutional obstacles. In response, the In-
dex ties jurisdictions into a centralized system of measurement and feed-
back.147 The lack of political incentives and rewards is another institu-
tional obstacle. The shaming device (or positive publicity) of ranking 
jurisdictions is to help overcome the political obstacles by bringing elec-
tion administration issues to the attention of the public in a way that the 
public can understand.148 The hope is that politicians will be pressured to 
focus on the issue for fear of being punished at the ballot box. 
Finally, the Index is also supposed to help us figure out “how to 
fix” the problems. 149  Measuring performance and figuring out what 
works and what is broken is the first step to identifying solutions. But 
performance measurement, which tells us about outputs, does not neces-
sarily generate solutions, and innovative ones still less.150 It does not 
necessarily offer access to internal operational data, but merely external 
performance measures or outputs. And it does not necessarily encourage 
public or third-party participation in problem solving. Instead of collect-
ing data to hold election administrators accountable, an Open Govern-
ment approach might first develop and offer services or other technolo-
gies that address specific operational problems and might generate per-
formance data only in the process of providing services to local election 
administrators. 
Thus while Gerken’s “data-driven” approach shifts the focus of 
election reformers away from rights to operations, it fits better with right-
to-know transparency (accountability via the Index) or transparency as 
regulation (identification of problems and best practices by means of 
standardized disclosure targeted at state and local election officials) than 
with Open Government. 
In 2013, the White House appointed a Presidential Commission on 
Election Administration,151 which took very much the same approach as 
Gerken to addressing the problems in the U.S. election system. The 
Commission pursued a data-driven approach to improving election oper-
                                                 
 147. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 
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ations while avoiding politically contentious voting rights issues.152 The 
Commission created a kind of online clearinghouse for studies and data 
about election administration, thus opening up the data on which its re-
port was based.153 It also called for data sharing to address previously 
intractable problems like maintaining accurate voter registration data, 
and fostering collaboration among election administrators to improve 
election administration.154 
What it did not do was encourage the creation of digital platforms 
by means of which government is one of many, not the only, active driv-
er of innovation and improved operations. But it recognized that data 
sharing by states in the voter registration context have helped overcome 
previously intractable problems in the management of voter registration 
databases. We thus turn to the Pew Trust’s use of something like a new 
Open Government approach to improve voter registration by means of 
such interstate data sharing. But first we must review the challenges to 
voter registration in greater detail to clarify how the Pew Trust’s effort 
goes beyond the mere generation of performance data or mere data shar-
ing. 
B. The Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) 
The election law community approached voter registration primari-
ly as a problem of voting rights, because voter registration had been a 
principal tool for denying minorities (and others) the right to vote.155 
Gaining access to the polls by registering black voters was one of the 
defining issues of the civil rights movement.156 But the important voter 
registration cases of the 1970s and 1980s also made it clear that voter 
registration represents a huge logistical challenge for local election offi-
cials who are responsible for maintaining their voter rolls.157 These logis-
                                                 
 152. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., supra note 21, at 70 (“If the experience of 
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tical difficulties were used as defenses by election officials in voter regis-
tration cases.158 As a result, the operational difficulties of voter registra-
tion may not have received the attention they should have from the elec-
tion law community until recently. 
In 1993, the Clinton Administration passed the so-called Motor 
Voter Law, which required states to offer voters the opportunity to regis-
ter at their Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) office when obtaining 
their driver’s license.159 The law also required states to accept a uniform 
national voter registration form.160 This was a first step towards centraliz-
ing some aspects of administering voter registration at the state level. But 
only after the debacle in Florida during the 2000 presidential elections 
did Congress decide to tackle the dysfunctional system of voter registra-
tion at the federal level. Congress got it mainly right with the Help 
America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), when it focused on dysfunctional 
voter registration systems as a culprit for the many problems that oc-
curred in the 2000 presidential elections.161 
1. Why Voter Registration is Central 
Voter registration is central to elections. Voter rolls provide a base-
line for the accuracy of elections and are critical for election operations. 
Voter registration rolls “are used to assign precincts, send sample ballots, 
provide polling place information, identify and verify voters at polling 
places, and determine how resources, such as paper ballots and voting 
machines, are deployed on Election Day.”162 The accuracy of registration 
lists determines how long the lines are at polling places, whose votes are 
counted, who is turned away, and how many provisional ballots are 
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cast.163 In close elections, like the 2000 presidential race in Florida, inac-
curacies and failures of the voter registration system can determine the 
outcome. 
Maintaining voter registration rolls is not as simple as it sounds. 
Demographics, the institutional design of election administration, and the 
process of registration all create significant challenges for maintaining 
accurate lists. Voters come of voting age, register to vote for the first 
time (at all ages), get married and change their names, move, die, lose 
their right to vote because of a felony conviction, or become inactive be-
cause they fail to vote for several election cycles. Moreover, the underly-
ing geography changes; for example, election districts, polling places, 
city limits, and street names all change frequently. Moreover, Americans 
are notorious for their mobility, and the numbers best reflect the chal-
lenges of maintaining accurate rolls. Every four years, almost half of all 
Americans move.164 During the 2012 federal election cycle, states report-
ed receiving over 62.5 million voter registration forms.165 
Beyond issues involving the sheer number of registrants and mobile 
voters, American election officials must also depend on the voters them-
selves, or third parties such as libraries, social services offices, churches, 
unions, and public interest groups like the Women’s League of Voters, 
Common Cause, or the NAACP, to register or initiate a change of ad-
dress in their voter registration records. Unlike most Europeans, Ameri-
cans are not required to register their place of residence with local au-
thorities. Since the enactment of the “Motor Voter Law” in 1993, states 
have been required to offer voter registration services to those obtaining 
driver’s licenses at their local DMV,166 which has become the primary 
venue for registration. But gaps within the system involving accurate 
registration and residency tracking are still evident. 
In addition to the demographic problem of registering voters is the 
clerical challenge. Voter registration in most states is still largely paper-
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based, so any changes must be keyed into an electronic database. And 
because forms are largely filled out by hand, error rates are very high, 
with one estimate claiming that one in eight registration records are inac-
curate.167 But accuracy is critical in that a voter will not be permitted to 
cast a regular ballot at a polling place for which she is not registered, or 
if her identification does not match her voter registration record. 
Added to these challenges is the fact that most voters become inter-
ested in voting close to election time. This means that voter registration 
takes place in a compressed time frame, rather than evenly spread out 
over the year. County voter registration offices with limited staff are 
overwhelmed with applications and inquiries just when their workload is 
at its peak in preparation for actual elections. Hiring temporary staff to 
process voter registration applications during this period does not solve 
the problem because temporary workers still need training, supervision, 
computer terminals, and a place to work, thereby stressing already lim-
ited resources.168 In short, the U.S. voter registration system is seriously 
compromised, and as a result, so are elections themselves. 
2. The Failure of HAVA Systems to Solve the Problem 
By 2008, most states had built statewide voter registration data-
bases that were mandated by HAVA. HAVA centralized voter registra-
tion record keeping at the state level, giving local election officials across 
the state access to all records. These databases cost each state tens of mil-
lions of dollars to build.169 In some states, HAVA systems allow the 
DMV to key voter registration information directly into the system. 
HAVA systems also typically offer registrars some utilities for identify-
ing records that should be purged from their systems. 
HAVA systems identify voters by assigning them unique ID num-
bers. In order for a new voter to be registered in the HAVA system and a 
new ID number generated, each voter must provide one of three forms of 
authorized identification: their current driver’s license, their birth certifi-
cate, or the last four digits of their social security number.170 Only where 
                                                 
 167. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 162, at 3. 
 168. Additionally, temporary workers have less experience and increased error rates in data 
entry, which are already very high. 
 169. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC’YS OF STATE, HOW STATES ARE USING FEDERAL FUNDS TO 
CARRY OUT THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT (HAVA): NASS REPORT ON STATE HAVA SPENDING 
FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 10–17 (2010), available at 
http://www.nass.org/component/docman/?task=doc_download&gid=1023&Itemid=469. 
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 15483 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 21083 (2014)). 
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a voter possesses none of these identifications can she be registered using 
an alternative procedure, such as an affidavit.171 
HAVA databases were typically built by sophisticated contractors 
like IBM. But in spite of the millions in federal grants spent on these sys-
tems, research conducted by the Pew Center on the States between 2009 
and 2011 showed that voter registration still remained the number one 
problem in election administration.172 Registration rolls are still inaccu-
rate, are rife with errors, contain millions of duplicate records, and in-
clude millions of voters who are no longer eligible or alive.173 Registrars 
still purge voters mistakenly.174 
Why, after millions of dollars in federal grants spent, is voter regis-
tration still dysfunctional? The answer to this question has several parts. 
First, the basic nature of the problem remains. Registering millions of 
voters and updating records under current conditions presents significant 
challenges. As outlined, these conditions include the rush of registration 
applications or changes just prior to elections; the high mobility of the 
U.S. population (including across state lines); the lack of a required na-
tional or state ID; and the fact that Americans are not required to report 
or register their residence with local authorities. 
Second, the institutional structure of election administration and 
voter registration that has been established in the states is challenging. 
HAVA systems proved difficult to design because they had to provide 
solutions consistent with existing institutional structures and relevant 
state laws and regulations. Every state created its own separate statewide 
voter registration system under HAVA, and these separate systems do 
not communicate with other state systems.175 But as discussed above, 
increasingly large numbers of voters move across state lines every year, 
which requires comparing voter registration records and other infor-
mation, like driver’s licenses, that can only be found in these separate 
state systems. Because the HAVA systems are accessible only to election 
officials of that state, such comparisons generally occur manually and by 
telephone, if they occur at all. 
Furthermore, voter registration is highly decentralized, in spite of 
statewide databases. While the DMV and other state and federal agencies 
collect and provide important or relevant data, “[l]ocal jurisdictions con-
tinue to serve as middlemen between voters and the statewide list . . . and 
                                                 
 171. Id. 
 172. See generally PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 162. 
 173. Id. at 1. 
 174. Id. 
 175. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., supra note 21, at 27. 
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Departments of Motor Vehicles . . . often fail to integrate the data they 
receive with the statewide list.”176 Even as most registrations are now 
made in person at the local DMV office because of the Motor Voter Law, 
records are often still transferred to the relevant county, either electroni-
cally or on paper, for the information to be merged or manually typed 
into the system by the local registrar to become effective.177 
Third, voter ID requirements that have been passed have made the 
inaccuracies of the registration rolls much more consequential. Where 
previously, some discretion might be exercised at the polls where an ob-
vious typo or mistake had clearly been made in the registration record, 
the new voter ID requirements tolerate no discrepancy between the ID 
presented at the polls and the voter registration record.178 Therefore, the 
bar has been raised for the level of accuracy of voter registration records. 
In short, the traditional state-based, government contracting approach 
ultimately was, and has continued to be, unable to address the fundamen-
tal problem of creating and maintaining accurate voter rolls. 
3. Pew’s Development of ERIC 
The problem of maintaining accurate voter registration rolls cannot 
effectively be solved at the state level because a good deal of the infor-
mation a state needs to maintain such lists is in the voter registration and 
DMV databases of other states.179 States would, therefore, benefit from 
sharing voter registration data. For example, duplicate registrations in a 
state’s database could be identified by tracing them to a common past 
address, voters who moved from State A and registered or obtained a 
driver’s license in State B could be purged from the system in State A, 
and inaccuracies in a record due to input mistakes could be detected and, 
as a result, the rate of false negatives in the verification of social security 
numbers could be improved.180 But barriers to such a system exist within 
state laws that prohibit state election officials from providing third par-
                                                 
 176. Id. at 23. 
 177. Id. at 22. 
 178. See, e.g., Required Identification for Voting in Person, VOTETEXAS.GOV, http://votetexas 
.gov/register-to-vote/need-id/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (“Election officials will now be required by 
State law to determine whether the voter’s name on the identification provided matches the name on 
the official list of registered voters (“OLRV”). After a voter presents their ID, the election worker 
will compare it to the OLRV. If the name on the ID matches the name on the list of registered voters, 
the voter will follow the regular procedures for voting.”). 
 179. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., supra note 21, at 28. 
 180. Id. 
2015] Election Reform from an Open Government Perspective 1041 
ties with access to all of the information in their voter registration data-
bases.181 
Recognizing that the problem of maintaining voter registration rolls 
could not be solved at the state level, the Pew Center for the States con-
vened a working group of election officials from different states to ex-
plore possible joint solutions together with Jeff Jonas, a leader in data 
integration and data privacy at IBM.182 After several working group ses-
sions, Jonas introduced an innovative solution based on methods previ-
ously applied in the private sector to solve similar problems.183 He devel-
oped an algorithm that could extract information from one state’s indi-
vidual voter registration records and share that information with another 
state without compromising the privacy of an individual record or the 
separateness of the systems.184 In 2012, Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, 
Nevada, Utah, Virginia, and Washington formed the Election Registra-
tion Information Center (ERIC), a data center owned, managed, and 
funded by state election officials for that purpose.185 
ERIC functions by allowing a third party to obtain information 
from separate state voter registration databases in a manner that was pre-
viously unavailable.186 ERIC mines such data to extract value from the 
secure databases that comprise the voter registration system of participat-
ing states.187 It also offers an “interface” between the operations of other 
states via ERIC, even as each state’s secure data is only made partially 
available to “add context” or bits of information to what is already con-
tained in the records of other, separate state voter registration data-
bases.188 The solution is ingenious because it allows all the benefits of 
open data without one of the major downsides: the danger of compromis-
                                                 
 181. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 97.0585(1)(c) (2014) (exempting “[t]he social security number, 
driver license number, and Florida identification number of a voter registration applicant or voter” 
from disclosure under Florida’s public records laws). 
 182 . Pew’s David Becker Discusses the Electronic Registration Information Center, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (July 23, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-
releases/2013/06/28/pews-david-becker-discusses-the-electronic-registration-information-center. See 
also VA. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, ANNUAL REPORT ON VOTER REGISTRATION LIST MAINTENANCE 
ACTIVITIES: REPORT TO THE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES ON PRIVILEGES AND ELECTIONS 5–7 
(2014), available at http://elections.virginia.gov/Files/maintenance-reports/2013SBEListMaintenan 
cereport.pdf. 
 183. Pew’s David Becker, supra note 182. 
 184. Id. 
 185. ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.ericstates.org (last visit-
ed Feb. 26, 2015). 
 186. ELEC. REGISTRATION INFO. CTR., ERIC: TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY OVERVIEW (2014), 
available at http://www.ericstates.org/images/documents/ERIC_Tech_and_Security_Brief_v2.1.pdf. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
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ing either the government’s own data security and integrity, or the priva-
cy of individuals whose data is stored in the system. 
ERIC reflects the kind of collective problem solving envisioned by 
Open Government enthusiasts. Pew’s solution to the burdens placed on 
citizens’ voting rights—insufficient polling places, hour-long waits, in-
accurate voter registration information—was to approach these problems 
as operational. Pew recognized that value was currently locked up in the 
separate voter registration databases and that information sharing could 
improve the efficiency of each state’s voter registration process. It took 
Pew’s social entrepreneurship, private sector expertise, and collaboration 
between election officials from different states and the private sector to 
invent and implement a solution. 
IV. OPEN GOVERNMENT IN THE REDISTRICTING CONTEXT 
Drawing electoral districts is an essential administrative require-
ment for holding district-based elections. It is also a major building block 
of our democratic institutions. The shapes and sizes of legislative dis-
tricts determine who gets elected to decide, inter alia, where roads are 
built, how schools are funded, and whether to build medical facilities in a 
community. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1960s “one-person, one-vote” 
decision requires that election districts be redrawn upon completion of 
each decennial census.189 All congressional, state, and local legislatures 
are subject to this rule.190 “One-person, one-vote,” the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 (as amended), state constitutions, state laws, and local charters 
all govern the redistricting process.191 
The legitimacy of traditional redistricting has long been subject to 
question. Because there are many possible outcomes that are justifiable, 
even within the legal constraints listed above, procedural fairness mat-
ters.192 Of primary concern is the fact that redistricting is conducted by 
legislators who have a stake in their own reelection and can manipulate 
the outcome to protect their incumbency.193 Redistricting has thus always 
been a highly politicized process in which political parties have typically 
sought to shore up their majorities by redrawing their district lines (as 
opposed to winning over a greater number of voters by persuasion). It 
                                                 
 189. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964). 
 190. Bd. of Estimate of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 692–93 (1989) (holding that NYC 
Board of Estimate violates “one-person, one-vote” rulings). 
 191 . See generally Mohr v. Erie Cnty. Legislature, No. 11-CV-559S, 2011 WL 3421326 
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2011). 
 192. Halberstam, supra note 4, at 448–49. 
 193. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 678 
(2013). 
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has also resulted in collusion between legislators of different parties to 
protect their incumbents against challengers, regardless of party affilia-
tion.194 
Ex post litigation claiming racial vote dilution and equal protection 
violations under the “one-person, one-vote” rule afford some relief under 
specific circumstances.195 But many redistricting choices that are conse-
quential have little to do with legal requirements such as voter discrimi-
nation, which can be litigated. Running roughshod across geographic 
boundaries, dividing communities of interest, and carving out a district 
for incumbent protection purposes, does not, in and of itself, amount to a 
legal violation in most jurisdictions.196 
As a result, reformers have focused on achieving transparency and 
public participation in the redistricting process. Transparency and public 
participation in redistricting has, in the past, generally meant open meet-
ings, public hearings, meeting agendas, hearing transcripts, the distribu-
tion of informational materials, and maps. 
But the high political stakes, the institutional context of the redis-
tricting process, the technical and legal requirements for producing an 
authoritative map, and the compressed timeline in which it takes place 
make redistricting a tough candidate for real transparency or public par-
ticipation. 197  But “[r]ecent technological innovations have enabled 
broader public participation” in redistricting.198 
Section A, below, briefly describes how redistricting has become a 
subject for Open Government efforts. The following sections discuss 
                                                 
 194. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 593 (2002). New York State has traditionally been subject to this kind of bipartisan gerryman-
der, where the parties agree to have Democrats redistrict the State Assembly and Republicans redis-
trict the State Senate. Collusion also occurs at the local levels. Halberstam, supra note 4, at 452. See 
also Cuomo to Sign Redistricting Lines, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 15, 2012; Thomas Kaplan, Albany 
Redrawing Political Map With Old Lines of Thought, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2012, at A1. 
 195. The Supreme Court’s “one-person, one-vote” cases require equipopulous districts, with 
some greater flexibility at the local level, thereby giving rise to equal protection claims. See, e.g., 
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 742 (1983); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act authorizes federal civil rights actions to protect, inter alia, against racial 
vote dilution in redistricting. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 
10301 (2014)). See also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 196. See Steve Bickerstaff, Making Local Redistricting Less Political: Independent Redistrict-
ing Commissions for U.S. Cities, 13 ELECTION L.J. 419, 428 (2014) (describing local redistricting 
criteria and noting that Austin, Texas, for example, prohibits drawing lines to favor incumbents). 
 197. Halberstam, supra note 4, at 453. 
 198. Micah Altman & Michal P. McDonald, Public Participation GIS: The Case of Redistrict-
ing 1 (Proceedings of the 47th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences, Sept. 6, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2321870. 
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different ways in which Open Government projects have been imple-
mented in the redistricting context. 
A. The Use of GIS Technology in Redistricting 
Since the 1990s, line drawing has been performed by means of in-
creasingly sophisticated Geographic Information Systems (GIS) that rely 
on data sets built specifically for redistricting purposes. New datasets for 
every state, most counties and cities, and some other local political units 
must be constructed every ten years based on the U.S. census, state voter 
registration information, state and local election data, and political data. 
All of this information must be geo-coded, which means that it must be 
reported in common geographical units so as to be readable by geograph-
ic information systems. The one-time construction cost of a redistricting 
database for a city or county can be in the tens of thousands of dollars, 
and the cost of constructing a statewide redistricting database costs from 
hundreds of thousands of dollars per year199 to over a million dollars per 
year for some states like New York.200 But the construction and assess-
ment of districting plans is not possible without the kind of precision that 
GIS software provides. Challenges to existing or proposed plans, wheth-
er during the process of redistricting, or immediately thereafter in court, 
will depend on using the proper statistical and GIS tools that are now 
considered standard. 
To the extent that public interest groups seek meaningful input in 
any changes to district boundaries, they must first gain access to the data 
on the basis of which redistricting decisions are made. Transparency and 
public participation in the age of computerized redistricting, thus, re-
quires public access, especially by national, state, and local interest 
groups, to the government’s redistricting datasets. Redistricting presents 
an exemplary Open Government problem, as was recognized during the 
last redistricting cycle by experts on both sides of the political aisle. 
B. Open Data and Public Participation in Redistricting 
In a joint proposed set of “Transparency Principles” for redistrict-
ing, experts from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Brook-
                                                 
 199. In 2012, California’s budget allocated less than $600,000 a year to California’s Statewide 
Database. Email from Karin Mac Donald, Director of California’s Statewide Database (Feb. 3, 2012) 
(on file with author). 
 200. New York State’s budget allocated over $1.8 million dollars to New York State’s Legisla-
tive Task Force for Demographic Information and Redistricting (LATFOR) for the 2013 fiscal year. 
Rick Karlin, Work Over $1.9 Million Budget Survives, TIMES UNION (Apr. 3, 2012), 
http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Work-over-1-9M-budget-survives-3457174.php. 
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ings Institution (Brookings) expressly called for measures that went far 
beyond traditional open records and open meeting laws.201 The AEI–
Brookings principles demanded that redistricting plans and the underly-
ing data be actively made available online in easily readable formats that 
could be read and analyzed with different types of GIS software.202 They 
also demanded that software necessary to recreate and analyze redistrict-
ing plans and community boundaries be made publicly available.203 The 
AEI–Brookings principles thus called for the establishment of a platform 
for public participation in the development of redistricting plans. 
The California’s Statewide Database (SWDB)204 can be said to pro-
vide such a platform. Although access to redistricting software itself is 
not provided online, it is available at various physical locations during 
periods of active redistricting.205 California’s SWDB is the most sophis-
ticated provider of Open Data in the redistricting context and was itself 
influential in the development of the AEI–Brookings principles. 
The SWDB publishes the very same data that it generates for offi-
cial redistricting, which until recently was conducted by the legisla-
ture.206 And it does so as soon as the data becomes available. In other 
words, it does not generate one set of data for insiders and another, more 
limited set for online public disclosure. Moreover, it collects redistrict-
ing, electoral, and political data on an ongoing basis and makes this data 
available not only during the decennial redistricting cycle, but also be-
tween redistricting periods to candidates running for office, public inter-
est groups, litigants, and others. 
The SWDB makes all the data available online in verifiable, under-
standable, and useable formats. This dissemination means that SWDB 
additionally provides clear documentation on the original sources, chain 
of ownership, and all modifications made to the data. It also publishes a 
description of statistical methods used to disaggregate and extrapolate 
from datasets reported for different geographical units in the creation of 
election, voter registration, and political data reported at the census block 
                                                 
 201. See Micah Altman et al., Principles for Transparency and Public Participation in Redis-
tricting, BROOKINGS INST. (June 17, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/06/ 
17-redistricting-statement. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. STATEWIDE DATABASE, http://statewidedatabase.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). 
 205. Mac Donald, supra note 25, at 483. 
 206. See Information About the Statewide Database, STATEWIDE DATABASE, http://statewide 
database.org/about.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2015) for a description of the SWDB’s mission. 
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level.207 In so doing, SWDB goes far beyond the ex post production of 
already existing government information that is required of governments 
in response to freedom of information requests.208 
While the purpose of Open Data in redistricting is also accountabil-
ity, the aim of the AEI–Brookings principles, and the SWDB’s imple-
mentation of these principles, is to enable public participation in the re-
districting process, in spite of the complexity that redistricting by GIS 
has introduced, and building on recent developments in this technology. 
The SWDB does much more than comparable redistricting data-
bases with less. The New York State Legislative Task Force for Demo-
graphic Information and Redistricting (LATFOR) provides a good com-
parison. 209  LATFOR generates redistricting data for New York’s 
statewide legislative redistricting. It is an arm of the legislature, it does 
not support local redistricting efforts in any way, nor does it have a pub-
lic information mission. Appendix A includes a detailed comparison be-
tween the SWDB and LATFOR’s online publications.210 It shows that 
LATFOR does none of what the AEI–Brookings principles require, ex-
cept perhaps that it provides certain data in CSV files on its website that 
a highly specialized user can load into a GIS system. 211  Otherwise, 
                                                 
 207 . See, e.g., KENNETH F. MCCUE, CREATING CALIFORNIA’S REDISTRICTING DATABASE 
(2011), available at http://statewidedatabase.org/d10/Creating%20CA%20Official%20Redistricting 
%20Database.pdf. 
 208. Large, unmanageable TIGER files—essentially the U.S. Census Bureau’s digital maps 
onto which data is geo-coded—are broken up and configured, so that less sophisticated users with 
more limited understanding and computing capacity can work with them. Each data file is produced 
in several different formats so that the file can be analyzed and used with different types of GIS 
software. For users without specialized software, the SWDB provides access to, and assistance with 
using, such software at specific locations. Moreover, it provides interactive data visualizations and 
other tools and information for the general public. See infra Appendix A: Comparing New York and 
California Online Redistricting Transparency in 2011–2012 Redistricting Cycle for a description and 
breakdown of data published by the SWDB. 
 209. See supra notes 199 and 200 comparing budgets for California and New York redistrict-
ing databases. Whereas LATFOR performs both database and redistricting functions during redis-
tricting, it presumably reverts to its database management in off years. 
 210. The study was conducted by Andrew Dean and Michael Halberstam, relying on the mate-
rial that LATFOR had posted in 2012 after completing the statewide legislative redistricting. But 
LATFOR posted its data very late and some public information materials, like videos of LATFOR 
hearings, were posted only after LATFOR had submitted its state legislative maps. The legislature 
failed to agree on a congressional map, which was drawn in federal court. Thomas Kaplan, New 
Congressional Lines Imposed by Federal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, at A23, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/nyregion/judges-impose-new-congressional-map-for-new-
york.html. 
 211. Typically specialists in this small group have longstanding relationships with LATFOR, 
such that they obtain their information directly from the agency (based on conversations with GIS 
and redistricting specialists, who ask not to be identified). Moreover, LATFOR’s data belongs to the 
legislature. It sells certain data compilations to individual politicians and political parties. 
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LATFOR does not provide any meaningful documentation as to how the 
numbers in the data files were arrived at.212 The differences between the 
SWDB and LATFOR reflect a fundamental difference between Califor-
nia’s new Open Government approach and New York’s classic approach 
dating back to the 1980s. LATFOR seeks only to satisfy minimal disclo-
sure requirements. In contrast, the SWDB is designed to offer open ac-
cess to redistricting data in formats that enable public participation in 
decisionmaking.213 
C. Online Mapping 
The SWDB provides so-called WebGIS or online data visualiza-
tions, mapping historical and existing election districts, lines of political 
subdivisions, and certain demographics. But it is unable to have users 
engage in online mapping. 
For the 2010 redistricting cycle, the Public Mapping Project, led by 
Micah Altman and Michael MacDonald, set out to create an Internet-
based redistricting tool that would allow nonspecialized users to engage 
in actual online mapping, the assessment of alternative redistricting 
plans, and the evaluation of the impact of redistricting—acting much as 
the specialized software does, except that the more difficult task of pre-
paring and loading the redistricting data into the software would be taken 
care of by the system’s administrators.214 Users simply had to learn to 
manipulate the data through a relatively simple user interface that could 
readily be understood with minimal training. 215  The result, called 
DistrictBuilder, is an open-source, web-hosted redistricting application 
“designed to give the public transparent, accessible, and easy-to-use on-
line mapping tools.”216 The Public Mapping Project held redistricting 
competitions in different states and localities to involve the public in 
generating redistricting plans.217 
Making redistricting data and online mapping tools available to the 
public at no cost appears to have contributed to a dramatic increase in 
                                                 
 212. See infra Appendix A: Comparing New York and California Online Redistricting Trans-
parency in 2011–2012 Redistricting Cycle for a description of information that LATFOR made 
public on its website. 
 213. See Information About the Statewide Database, supra note 206. 
 214. Altman & McDonald, supra note 198, at 1. 
 215. See PUBLIC MAPPING PROJECT, www.publicmapping.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). 
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 217 . See, e.g., Michael McDonald, Virginia Redistricting Competition Concludes, PUBLIC 
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districtingcompetitionconcludes. See also Altman & McDonald, supra note 198, at 5. 
1048 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:1007 
public participation in redistricting in 2010. Public participation, meas-
ured by publicly submitted maps, increased by orders of magnitude in 
2010 compared to 2000.218 In some cases, public maps were influential. 
In Minneapolis, a citizens commission for city council districts incorpo-
rated ideas from community organizations developed using 
DistrictBuilder into its final maps.219 Moreover, publicly drawn maps 
were occasionally influential in the courts, as in Pennsylvania, where the 
state supreme court found a plan drawn by a piano teacher with 
DistrictBuilder to be superior to the state legislature’s plan.220 Online 
mapping enabled the public and the media to evaluate redistricting plans 
in more sophisticated ways “that demonstrated how deficiencies could be 
addressed.”221 
D. Redistricting by Independent Commission 
Citizens’ redistricting in California built on the SWDB’s Open Data 
to realize Open Government in California’s 2011–2012 statewide redis-
tricting round.222 Prior to the latest decennial redistricting cycle, Califor-
nia’s constitution relegated state legislative and congressional redistrict-
ing to the state legislature in Sacramento. In 2008 and 2010, California 
passed constitutional amendments that turned redistricting over to an in-
dependent Citizens Redistricting Commission (CRC).223 
The goal of an independent redistricting commission is to take re-
districting out of the hands of legislators.224 The CRC was designed to be 
independent, first, in the sense that the legislature does not engage in the 
actual line drawing (no conflict of interest), and second, in the sense that 
the legislature has no say in the enactment of the redistricting plan (au-
tonomy).225 While a number of states have so-called advisory commis-
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sions, back-up commissions, or political commissions, which result in 
various degrees of separation between legislators and line drawing, typi-
cally an inverse relationship exists between independent line drawing 
and the autonomy of the commission because legislators are generally 
unwilling to give up control over the composition of their districts. 
California’s redistricting commission represents the most radical 
departure from the model of legislative control. Neither legislatures nor 
political parties have control over the pool of candidates from which 
commissioners are chosen, and the CRC has complete autonomy in that 
its redistricting plan is not subject to legislative approval. 
One of the most radical features of the CRC is the selection process 
for commissioners. The selection of commissioners includes a process 
with several phases, intended “to squeeze every ounce of incumbent and 
legislative influence out of redistricting . . . .”226 
The independence, neutrality, and outcome of the CRC’s work have 
received some scholarly attention.227 Moreover, public debate has includ-
ed criticism of the selection of the commission’s redistricting consultant, 
the fairness and neutrality of the process, and the commission’s respon-
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missioners. These eight commissioners then selected an additional six commissioners 
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“the lucky ones” while the final six were called “the chosen ones.” 
Mac Donald, supra note 25, at 478. 
 227. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 224; Justin Levitt, Essay: Weighing the Potential of Citizen 
Redistricting, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513 (2011); Mac Donald, supra note 25. See also Angelo N. 
Ancheta, Redistricting Reform and the California Citizens Redistricting Commission, 8 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 109 (2014). 
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siveness to groups like MALDEF, who were nonetheless unhappy with 
the CRC’s failure to maximize minority opportunity districts.228 
The CRC’s design, composition, and process of public line drawing 
represents an Open Government approach that does not necessarily fol-
low from the principles of nonlegislative line drawing and autonomy that 
Cain identifies as central to independent commissions in his 2012 post-
mortem of the CRC’s work.229 In other words, the participants could 
have chosen a somewhat different approach. While Section 2 of the Vot-
ers First Act required that “the commission shall . . . conduct an open and 
transparent process enabling full public consideration of and comment on 
the drawing of district lines,”230 the interpretation of the provision was 
left to: California’s state comptroller; the state auditor, who issued regu-
lations governing the process of selecting commissioners; Karin Mac 
Donald, the Director of the SWDB, whose separate consulting firm, Q2, 
won the bid for the contract to serve as the CRC’s consultant; and the 
commissioners themselves. 
Following the principles of Open Government that informed the 
SWDB, Mac Donald worked with the commission to come up with the 
unusual procedure of drawing all lines in public meetings.231 While the 
CRC operated under the state’s Bagley–Keene Open Meeting Act,232 
Mac Donald could instead have suggested different procedures consistent 
with the Act; namely that the Q2 consultants would draw the lines and 
present the commission with options—common practice followed by 
private redistricting consultants—or that the commissioners would meet 
in smaller groups for line drawing. Instead, the commission chose a pub-
lic process that would maximize public participation and input. Cain 
notes: 
The extent of the CRC’s public outreach was staggering: thirty-four 
public meetings in thirty-two locations around the state, more than 
2700 participants, and over 20,000 written comments. Moreover, 
the hearings were carried live by Internet and hearing transcripts 
made available on the commission’s webpage. The Irvine Founda-
                                                 
 228. See Cain, supra note 224, at 1828; Mac Donald, supra note 25, at 485 n.90. 
 229. In fact, Cain does not dwell on this aspect of the commission’s work in his discussion of 
the commission’s work, even as he advocated separately for transparency in redistricting at the state 
level in a short addendum to a report by the Irwin Foundation that he coauthored with Mac Donald. 
See BRUCE E. CAIN & KARIN MAC DONALD, TRANSPARENCY AND REDISTRICTING, a supplemental 
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ble at http://statewidedatabase.org/resources/redistricting_research/Transparency_&_Redistricting.pdf. 
 230. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(b). 
 231. Mac Donald, supra note 25, at 482–83; Ancheta, supra note 227, at 128. 
 232. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 11120–11132 (West 2012). 
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tion established outreach centers around the state that made soft-
ware and some computer assistance available to those who wanted 
to draw their own maps.233 
Cain is too quick to attribute the commission’s choices in this re-
gard to the state’s open meeting laws: “Bound by the state’s open meet-
ing laws to make decisions in public (including many legal and personnel 
discussions that often are held in executive session), there was little that 
the CRC could say or do that was not open for public inspection.”234 But 
as discussed in our treatment of the SWDB’s implementation of Open 
Data principles, we note that simply allowing access to meetings or data 
passively, which is really most of what open meeting laws require, falls 
far short of establishing a platform for information sharing and public 
and intergovernmental participation in joint problem solving. After all, 
New York has very similar open meeting laws to those of California. 
And LATFOR held over two-dozen hearings.235 But LATFOR did not 
webcast its meetings, engage in public line drawing, or otherwise create 
a platform for broad-based public participation.236 The state legislative 
maps it drew (congressional redistricting ended up in federal court) were 
issued at the last minute.237 It was clear that the (legislative) commis-
sion’s primary goal was to perpetuate the bipartisan gerrymander of the 
state legislature between Democrats and Republicans.238 
V. OPEN DATA AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 
In Shelby County v. Holder, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively 
ended federal oversight of state and local elections for violations of mi-
nority voting rights.239  Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
(VRA), jurisdictions identified as having systematically violated minori-
ty voting rights (covered jurisdictions) were required to submit all 
changes to their election laws and administrative procedures to the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division for “preclearance” before 
                                                 
 233. Cain, supra note 224, at 1826–27. 
 234. Id. at 1827. 
 235. See LATFOR website, http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/hearings/, for a list of hearings and 
meetings. 
 236. See infra Appendix A: Comparing New York and California Online Redistricting Trans-
parency in 2011–2012 Redistricting Cycle. See also Halberstam, supra note 4, at 463 & n.132, 468 
& n.167, 471 & n.182. 
 237. See Jimmy Vielkind, Judge Takes Over Redistricting, TIMES UNION (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Judge-takes-over-redistricting-3364883.php. 
 238. Gerald Benjamin, Encore for New York’s Redistricting Farce, TIMES UNION (Feb. 26, 
2012), http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/Encore-for-N-Y-s-redistricting-farce-3362816.ph 
p#ixzz1ngqdv9ch. 
 239. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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they could be enforced.240 The U.S. Attorney General then had sixty days 
to object to the changes or seek additional information.241 In a 5–4 deci-
sion in Shelby County v. Holder, the majority struck down the coverage 
formula set forth in § 4(a) of the Act on the grounds that it was “based on 
decades-old data and eradicated practices.”242 The result is that preclear-
ance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can no longer be enforced with-
out a case-specific judicial order.243 In addition, any recent Justice De-
partment “objections” or bars to the implementation of racially discrimi-
natory voting laws or procedures may now be void. 
The focus of current legislative efforts is to restore the Justice De-
partment’s power to review and object to proposed vote changes.244 But 
the success of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, under the 1971 guidelines 
issued by the Justice Department,245 was, in part, the result of a type of 
Open Government approach—before this approach was articulated in its 
present form.246 
A. The Post-Shelby Information Black-Out 
A further consequence of Shelby, one which has not been given 
much attention in the current debate on what to do in the wake of the de-
cision, is the resulting loss of transparency in both local election admin-
istration and redistricting efforts. 
I have argued elsewhere that § 5 operated primarily as an infor-
mation-pushing and learning-by-monitoring regime, given the very low 
rate of Justice Department objections to submissions.247 The detailed Jus-
tice Department guidelines for redistricting submissions, for example, 
required jurisdictions to submit proposed redistricting plans and, more 
recently, provide redistricting data in a standardized electronic format.248 
                                                 
 240. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2014)); 28 C.F.R. § 
51.7 (2015). 
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 242. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2617. 
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violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have occurred there.” Shelby Cnty., 133 S. 
Ct. at 2644. 
 244. See., e.g., Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2013–2014). 
 245. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 (2011). 
 246. Halberstam, supra note 3, at 927–28. 
 247. Id. at 928, 955–57. For statistics on objections, see generally U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL 
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The guidelines also required that this information be shared proactively 
with registered individuals and groups,249 including local minority repre-
sentatives.250 Additionally, the local jurisdiction was required to obtain 
the Justice Department’s feedback on the proposed plan.251 Covered ju-
risdictions were also required to hold public hearings and include hearing 
notices and news coverage of the hearings in their submission.252 Nation-
al advocacy groups, like the NAACP and the ACLU Voting Rights Pro-
ject, would routinely obtain the submissions from the Justice Department 
and weigh in while the preclearance decision was still pending. 
While civil rights groups have always focused on the sanctions 
available to the Justice Department and civil rights plaintiffs under the 
Voting Rights Act, the process of generating Justice Department submis-
sions, especially at the county and municipal levels, forced jurisdictions 
to consider the legal vote dilution standard ex ante as part of the redis-
tricting negotiations and decisionmaking process.253 Additionally, it ena-
bled advocacy groups, which could readily obtain this information in a 
timely fashion, to participate in the redistricting process by contacting 
the Justice Department and sharing their analyses and concerns. The Jus-
tice Department often asked for additional information before it would 
grant preclearance on submitted changes. Admittedly, all of this took 
place in the shadow of a potential Justice Department veto. The very low 
number of objections, even in the redistricting context, has been noted254 
and adduced as evidence by opponents of § 5 that preclearance was not 
needed.255 However, this ignores the fact that preclearance changed the 
institutional environment of state and local redistricting in covered juris-
dictions by requiring comprehensive disclosure.256 The Voting Section in 
the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division has maintained files on all 
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1054 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:1007 
preclearance submissions from the thousands of covered jurisdictions 
subject to the special provisions of the Act.257 Such submissions were 
made not just for redistricting purposes, but for any administrative 
changes, including the location of polling places, times and dates of spe-
cial elections, voter ID requirements, and so forth. 
In noncovered jurisdictions, however, the VRA did not require 
timely publication of state and local redistricting data.258 As a result, re-
districting maps are often rushed through legislatures without much time 
for public consideration or participation. In New York, for example, the 
result is that certain local jurisdictions are most likely in violation of § 2 
of the VRA without knowing it.259 Additionally, given the difficulties 
accessing redistricting information and data in noncovered local jurisdic-
tions in a timely fashion, it is unusual for national interest and advocacy 
groups, who have participated in the redistricting process in covered ju-
risdictions, to get involved at the local level in noncovered jurisdic-
tions.260 
Through Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court halted pre-
clearance. As a consequence, covered jurisdictions no longer provide 
redistricting data and information to the Justice Department or, conse-
quently, to the public. Covered jurisdiction states now “go dark” with 
regard to local redistricting, just as noncovered states already have. This 
results in a complete lack of oversight, as states generally do not get in-
volved in local redistricting, nor do they attempt to ascertain whether a 
particular local jurisdiction has redrawn its lines as required by the “one-
person, one-vote rule.” Furthermore, most states do not collect redistrict-
ing data, maps, or any other information pertaining to the local redistrict-
ing process,261 which is why the direct submission to the Justice Depart-
ment by every covered state and local jurisdiction was so valuable. 
                                                 
 257. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.50 (2011). 
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B. Open Data Platforms as Partial Solutions in a Post-Shelby World 
One way to address the information blackout in a post-Shelby world 
is by creating statewide, centralized open data platforms for local elec-
tion information, based on the model of California’s SWDB. Centralized 
statewide redistricting clearinghouses for local redistricting could, at the 
very least, address the information blackout in a post-Shelby world, and 
change the institutional structure in noncovered jurisdictions where local 
redistricting is an opaque process. 
Currently, the New York State Democracy Clearinghouse 
(NYSDC) at S.U.N.Y. Buffalo Law School is in the process of develop-
ing a Web-accessible platform to help reshape the institutional environ-
ment in which redistricting and local election administration takes place 
in the state of New York.262 The platform is to include a database con-
taining election results, maps, redistricting data, and other political and 
demographic information, thereby supporting state and local election 
officials throughout their redistricting process. At the same time, the plat-
form will provide a centralized service to local jurisdictions, which will 
help them satisfy their public information needs surrounding redistrict-
ing—a process that presently occurs in an ad hoc and sporadic fashion.263 
The goal is to make redistricting more accessible to general and special-
ized publics, and enable greater public participation in the process, while 
also satisfying the data requirements of legal challenges to minority vote 
dilution or attempts at vote suppression, such as the misallocation of 
polling places.264 These efforts can draw on the rapid changes in infor-
mation technology. Information technology has changed dramatically 
since the 2000 redistricting cycle, making the 2010 redistricting cycle the 
first in which several cloud-based redistricting tools became available 
online. 265  As a result, the NYSDC platform might integrate next-
generation tools such as DistrictBuilder. By creating a centralized plat-
form that serves election administrators, legislators, and the public, the 
institutional environment for redistricting can be changed. 
Professor Samuel Issacharoff has argued that the § 5 preclearance 
regime should be replaced by a federal regime of standardized regulatory 
disclosure.266 Under his proposed system, Congress would pass a law that 
                                                 
 262 . See New York State Democracy Clearinghouse, SUNY BUFFALO L. SCH. JAECKLE 
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would require election officials at all levels of state and local government 
to report all changes made to election practices, within a fixed period of 
any federal election, to a federal agency that would be charged with im-
mediately posting the disclosures online upon their receipt.267 Each dis-
closure would have to identify the changed practice and the reason for 
the change, and would possibly include an impact statement of the likely 
anticipated effect on ballot access or on minority voters. Issacharoff en-
visions such a regime working very much the same as federal securities 
disclosure: “The disclosure would then set the template for either DOJ 
challenge or private party challenge, with the disclosure serving as the 
prima facie evidentiary basis. This result both facilitates prosecution and 
review, and forces transparency and accountability on administrative 
conduct prompted by partisan or other malevolent objectives.”268 
Issacharoff characterizes his approach as a “smart disclosure” ap-
proach, which reflects Fung and coauthors’ insight that disclosure re-
gimes do not work very well unless information users can actually re-
spond to the information by doing something.269  In Issacharoff’s ap-
proach, this is satisfied by the prediction that information users can sue. 
It is “this critical approach to the use of after-the-fact-liability rules,”270 
instead of ex ante fixed regulation that he presents as a post-Shelby alter-
native.271 
Issacharoff’s disclosure approach is not without merit, but he miss-
es the fact that § 5 was very much a modern administrative approach and 
that the Justice Department and public interest groups, like the NAACP, 
relied heavily on such disclosure.272As already noted, the 1970s regula-
tions went beyond standardized disclosure to require data sharing in the 
redistricting context, which is perhaps what Issacharoff intended by re-
quiring an “impact statement” to accompany the disclosure. 
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A new Open Government approach, however, does not merely im-
pose ex post sanctions, but provides ex ante support to election officials. 
Instead of merely enabling ex post lawsuits based on standardized disclo-
sure information, a redistricting clearinghouse, like the NYSDC plat-
form, can offer local election officials more sophisticated and effective 
technology, for both information management and public communica-
tion, at a lower cost. Whereas the expectation is that local officials will 
make use of this opportunity, state requirements to participate in such 
information sharing certainly would not hurt. But in any case, the plat-
form approach aspires to do more than impose yet another unfunded fed-
eral disclosure mandate onto jurisdictions. Instead, it offers jurisdictions 
innovative tools to address their own administrative needs, while at the 
same time channeling their activities in new ways that change the institu-
tional environment at the local level. Under an Open Government ap-
proach, local jurisdictions don’t just disclose and hope for the best (i.e., 
no lawsuit); rather, technology is used to transform operations, and to 
encourage information sharing, collaboration, and public participation in 
problem solving. 
VI. QUESTIONS AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
In this Article, I have adopted primarily a descriptive approach. I 
here briefly identify some of the practical and normative problems that 
have been raised with regard to Open Government projects. I focus on 
three criticisms that are frequently heard. 
First, policymakers have long been concerned with e-government 
initiatives from a distributional perspective.273 A “digital divide” between 
those with access to the Internet and those lacking access was identified 
as early as the mid-1990s by the federal government.274 The concern has 
been that the digital divide would increase the existing social and eco-
nomic disadvantages faced by low-income populations and others simi-
larly disadvantaged because of their age, race, ethnicity, or geography.275 
Since then, access to the Internet has significantly increased,276 but other 
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resource questions, such as access to broadband, or time and resources to 
participate in interactive uses of Web 2.0, have become the focus of poli-
cymakers concerned about barriers to e-democracy for the disadvan-
taged.277 To the extent that Open Government relies not just on Internet 
access, but active participation and collaboration in problem solving, this 
raises questions about whether Open Government will ultimately in-
crease economic, social, and political inequities. 
Second, to the extent that Open Government encourages public–
private cooperation in government problem solving, it raises some of the 
same issues as other public–private partnerships. Outsourcing govern-
ment operations may diminish accountability, increase agency costs, and 
generate new inefficiencies due to loss of control and information asym-
metries.278 Moreover, access to government may be used to promote pri-
vate interests. Thus, for example, IBM’s initially free participation in 
ERIC turned into a source of revenue for IBM, which provided the new 
center with computing services. If government relies on private actors 
with superior knowledge sets and capacities to solve problems, can it 
properly assess the cost-effectiveness of the solutions offered and the 
results provided? 
A third critique of Open Government projects has been the disjunc-
tion between the promises of Open Data and its results.279 One of the as-
sumptions of Open Government is that there is enormous value locked 
up in inaccessible government datasets and information, and that data 
sharing by government will unlock that value. Accordingly, President 
Obama’s Open Government initiative called on all executive agencies to 
release “high value” datasets.280 Similarly, New York City’s Open Gov-
ernment website promised to afford ready access to high value datasets. 
But critics have noted that, upon examination, the data that has been 
made available through open data sites so far has been less than impres-
sive.281 
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These and other questions about Open Government are important to 
recognize and address to the extent possible, but they go beyond the 
scope of this paper. What we can say is that Open Government is not a 
panacea and cannot solve all problems. Like all other public policy ap-
proaches, it has to contend with complex realities. While it is helpful to 
bring the idea of Open Data out sharply in its theoretical relief, there will 
be some regions of experience that the theory maps onto better than oth-
ers. 
The goal of this Article has been to try to clarify how the contem-
porary Open Government idea can be distinguished from other concep-
tions of transparency, and to provide some concrete applications of Open 
Government in the election law context. In the future, it is at this level of 
application that the challenges and criticisms of Open Government must 
be addressed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article accomplishes two things. First, it clarifies the meaning 
of transparency in the legal literature by identifying four different senses 
in which the term is used, and by describing how the Open Government 
movement goes beyond traditional concepts of transparency. Second, it 
introduces the election law community to contemporary Open Govern-
ment ideas, shows how various election reform projects already draw on 
the Open Government toolkit, and explores further opportunities for the 
application of Open Government tools in the election reform context. 
Certain basic premises underlie the Open Government movement, not 
necessarily in the following order. 
The first premise is that information is valuable as a public good 
and that information sharing by all levels of government unlocks the val-
ue of a large store of information that is sitting unused. Information is a 
public good; one that can be put to multiple uses not contemplated by the 
original producer of the information. Thus, in the voter registration con-
text, no state had ever compiled its own voter registration list for the pur-
pose of helping other states scrub theirs. But by sharing such infor-
mation, states did just that, with the result being that all states benefitted 
from previously inaccessible information. 
A second premise is that information technology has transformed 
our industrial economies and modes of production to facilitate “social 
production” as it takes place on such platforms as Google, Amazon, Fa-
cebook, eBay, and Apple iOS. The goal of Open Government is to help 
government entities harness this technology-dependent social production 
and enlist others—government units, public interest groups, think tanks, 
experts, and the general public—in collective problem solving, thereby 
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doing more with less. In the redistricting context, the California SWDB’s 
Open Data project has worked with local election administrators to col-
lect their data and supply them with data maintenance services, all while 
making complete redistricting data publicly accessible online. It thereby 
does far more with less when compared, for example, with such redis-
tricting databases as New York’s LATFOR. 
A third premise of contemporary Open Government is that Internet-
based social production allows us to realize certain ideals of participatory 
democracy. California’s Citizens Redistricting Commission built on the 
SWDB’s Open Data project not merely to take redistricting out of the 
hands of legislators, but to encourage broad public participation. Not on-
ly did the CRC make its process transparent by opening its meetings, but 
it actively enlisted public participation in line drawing, which the com-
mission then integrated into its decisionmaking in public line drawing 
sessions. It thus created a platform for public participation mediated by 
the commissioners.282 
In the area of voting rights, by sharing data and information about 
redistricting and election administration at the local level, public plat-
forms could replace the federal government’s administrative preclear-
ance process, at least in part. By channeling redistricting and election 
administration through the use of shared technologies, such platforms 
could change institutional structures at the local level, not just in former-
ly covered jurisdictions, but nationwide. 
  
                                                 
 282. It must be admitted that the CRC was very costly and thus may not have done more with 
less. But it did do more in the way of addressing the redistricting problem with procedural fairness. 
However, the cost of legislative redistricting was not zero, especially if one includes all the “off 
balance sheet” payments by individual legislators to the outside redistricting consultant to secure 
viable district demographics for themselves. 
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APPENDIX A: COMPARING NEW YORK AND CALIFORNIA ONLINE 





NYS LATFOR CAL SWDB (or CRC 
Website, as appropriate) 
1. Geographical Data & Information 
2. • Final Maps of 2012 
State Legislative and 
Congressional Districts 
• Yes (limited infor-
mation) 
o PDFs with street 
names for districts 
in major cities 
o Limited or no ge-
ographical features 
• Yes 




with address look-ups 
in WebGIS 
3. • Reports and Documen-





o No explanation, 
justification, or 
documentation of 
the final maps 
• Yes 
o Extensive documenta-




separate full reports 
for all three statewide 
plans (CRC Website) 
4. • Maps of Existing 2001 
State Legislative and 
Congressional Districts  
• Yes  (limited infor-
mation) 
o PDFs of lines only 
for most districts 
o No street names, 
except for New 
York City districts 
o Limited or no ge-
ographical features 
• Yes 




with address look-ups 
in WebGIS 
5. • Shape Files for Election 
Districts 
• No 





o Shape files for three 
different GIS applica-
tions for 2011, 2001, 
1991 state legislative 
and congressional dis-
tricts 
o Clear disclosure of 
specific geographic 
reference data used 
(e.g., NAD 27 & 83) 
 
6. • TIGER Line/Boundary 
Files (Census Geogra-
phy)  
• No  (limited) 
o Raw data only 




o Census geography 
provided in multiple 
file formats 
o 2010, 2000, and 1998 
line vintages clearly 
distinguished 
o Extensive metadata 
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7. • Interactive Visualiza-
tions and Data Mapping 
• No • Yes 
o Data-visualizations in 
WebGIS 
8. • Boundary Lines for 
Precincts/Vote Tabula-
tion Districts 
• Yes (limited) 
o 2008 ED/2010 
VTD equivalency 
tables only 
o No documentation 
or metadata 
• Yes 
o Shape files provided in 
multiple files formats 
o Vintages clearly dis-
tinguished 
o Extensive metadata 
and information 
9. • VTD/Precinct to Block-





o Documentation and 
metadata 
10. • Historical Maps of State 
Legislative and Con-
gressional Districts  
• Yes (limited) 
o 1992 
 PDFs of lines 
only 





 No legislative 
information 
• Yes 
o 1990, 1980, 1970 
 PDFs, with street 
names and geo-
graphical features 
with links to legis-
lative sources 
11. • Proposed Maps • Yes (limited) 
o Final commission 
proposal in PDF 
format only 
o No data supplied, 





o Entire process of map-
ping publicized with 




12. • Public Proposals, Third 
Party Input 
 
• No • Yes 
o CRC Website 
13. • Final Maps of 2012 All 
Local Election Districts 
(county, legislative, city 
council, town/village 
council) 
• No • No 
14. • Current and Historical 
Maps of Local Election 
Districts (county legisla-
tive, city council, 
town/village council) 
• No • No 
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15. • Shape Files (current and 
historical) for Local 
Election District 
Boundaries 
• No • No 
16. Election & Political Data 
17. • Precinct Level Election 
Returns for Statewide 
Elections 
• Yes 
o Available for 
2010, 2009, 2008, 
2006, 2000, and 
1998 elections at 
state, county, mi-
nor civil division, 
and VTD level. 
o Data not disaggre-
gated at the block 
level. 
o 2010 data was 
posted late. 






o Available for 2010, 
2008, 2006, 2005 
(special), 2004, 2003 
(recall), 2002, 1998, 
1996, 1994, and 1992 
o Disaggregated to the 
block-level 
o Multiple file formats 
for ease of use with 
different kinds of GIS 
software 
o Extensive metadata 
and information on 
methods of disaggre-
gation 
18. • Voter Registration Data, 
Separate Files 
• No 
o See Line 27 
o No official voter 
registration data 
o No geo-coded vot-
er registration data 
o No block-level da-
ta 





o Detailed official voter 
registration statements 
by county and local 
political subdivision 
from 1962–present 
o Geo-coded voter regis-
tration data, disaggre-
gated to the block level 
o Extensive metadata 
and detailed explana-
tion of statistical 
methods used 
19. • Historic Election Re-
turns Prior Decades 
• Yes 
o Precinct level re-
turns for 1998 
elections 
o No block-level da-
ta 
• Yes 
o Various, including 
specialized reports 
20.    
21. • Precinct-Level Election 
Returns for All Local 
Elections 
• No • No 
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22. • Data and Information on 
All Local Elections and 
Representation, Includ-
ing Races, Candidates, 
Seats, and Type of Elec-
tion (e.g. at-large v. dis-
trict-based) 
• No • No 
23. Population and Ethnicity Data 
24. • Census Data File PL94-
171 
• Yes 
o Refers users to 
original, unassem-
bled files intended 
for experienced 
GIS users only 
• Yes 
o Repackaged census da-
ta for ease of use with 
all standard GIS appli-
cations 






ta processing and 
statistical methods 
• N/A 
o Not applicable to Cali-
fornia 
26. Election & Population/Ethnicity Data Combined 




See Also Line 3 
• Yes (limited) 
o Tabular data files 
combining demo-
graphic, ethnic, 
election, and voter 
registration data at 
the VTD level 
o No block-level da-
ta. 
o Usable with GIS 
software applica-
tions by experts 
only 





o Very limited doc-
umentation 
o No block-level da-
ta 
• Yes 
o Election, voter regis-
tration, population, and 
ethnicity data all in 
separate files, dis-
aggregated to the 
common block level 
o All data in compatible 
file formats and as-
sembled for ease of 
use with different GIS 
software 
o Extensive documenta-
tion on data sources, 
statistics, data assem-
bly, and use of data 
files with relevant 
software 




separate full reports 
for all three statewide 
plans (CRC Website) 




tion and metadata 
• N/A 
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29. • Election and Enrolment 
Data (disaggregated to 
the block level) 
• No • Yes 
30. Functionality & Ease of Use 
31. • Navigation • No 
o No site map 
o No search function 
o No explanation 
o No index 
• Yes 
o Site map 
o Search Function (Ad-
vanced) 
o Extensive explanation 
for each data type and 
item. 
32. • Accessibility of Data • No 
o Confusing web-
site. 
o Apart from PDFs, 
the information is 
inaccessible to op-
erators with gen-
eral GIS and data-
base experience 




relevant to 2011 
cycle filed under 
2000 redistricting 
o Census data pro-
vided in unassem-
bled files 
o Data cannot be 
pulled into stand-




o Block level  
• Yes 
o Data readily accessible 
to specialized and non-
specialized GIS and 
database users 
o Data visualizations for 
general public 
o Every data file and 
type is explained and 
documented 
o Census files assem-
bled, processed, and 
separated into files that 
can easily be pulled in-









33. • Relational Search & 
User Generated Data 
Reports & Comparisons 
Between Jurisdictions 
• No • No 
34. • User Tools • No • Yes 
o Data-visualizations, 
Web-GIS 
o Online Mapping Tool 
(CRC) 
o Provides hands-on as-
sistance in house to the 
public at the database 
(SWDB), and at vari-
ous locations during 
redistricting (CRC) 
1066 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:1007 
35. • Open Data Portal • No • No 
o Data currently gath-
ered and posted by 
staff. 
36. • Use of Open Source 
Platforms 
• No • No 
37. • Application Program-
ming Interface (API) 
• No • No 
38. Process & Transparency 
39. • Reports or Documenta-
tion Explaining Final 
Results 
• No 
o No explanation, 
justification, or 
documentation of 
the final maps 
• Yes 
o Extensive documenta-




separate full reports 
for all three statewide 
plans (CRC Website) 
o Resource identification 
information 
40. • Laws Governing 
Statewide Redistricting 
• No • Yes 
o SWDB includes select 
key voting rights cases 
articulating VRA 
standards 
o CRC includes full de-
scription of legal redis-
tricting requirements 
41. • Information Regarding 
Redistricting Litigation 
• No • Yes 
o Key cases, including 
cases litigating Cali-
fornia redistricting 
42. • Laws Governing Local 
Redistricting in All Lo-
cal Jurisdictions 
• No • Yes (limited) 
o Includes federal and 
state laws governing 
local redistricting, but 
not additional local re-
quirements/criteria 
43. • Hearing Notices, Tran-
scripts, Video, for 
Statewide Redistricting 
• Yes 
o But some with 
considerable delay 
and after the fact 
• Yes 
o (CRC Website) 
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44. • Hearing Notices, Tran-
scripts, Video for all 
Local Redistricting 
• No • Yes (limited) 
o Some limited infor-
mation on local redis-
tricting timelines post-
ed 
45. • Meeting Minutes 
Statewide Redistricting 
• Yes • Yes 
46. • Meeting Minutes Local 
Redistricting 
• No • No 
47. • Interactive Features for 
Users Regarding Local 
Redistricting 
• No • No 
48. • News Reports on 
Statewide Redistricting 
• No  




o Several hundred key 
news articles on sub-
stance and process of 
statewide redistricting 
(SWDB) 
o Hundreds of news sto-
ries covering full pro-
cess (CRC) 
49. • News Reports on Local 
Redistricting 
• No • No 
